The recent local government elections in Nigeria present an intriguing case for analysis through the lenses of governmentality and positionality. The outcomes, which saw dominant victories for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the All Progressives Congress (APC), and other smaller parties, reveal much about the dynamics of power and control in Nigeria’s political landscape. Despite many state governors having previously criticized the integrity of the national electoral system—especially when results were unfavorable to them—they appear to be beneficiaries of a similarly flawed local electoral process. Our analyst notes that this contradiction raises questions about their motivations and how they view elections as governance and political power instruments.

Governmentality: Elections as Instruments of Control

The concept of governmentality, introduced by French philosopher Michel Foucault, refers to how the state exercises control over the population through institutions, knowledge, and administrative measures. In the context of the recent local government elections in Nigeria, the results suggest that elections are not just democratic processes but also mechanisms through which the ruling political class exercises and consolidates power.

Local government elections are ostensibly designed to give grassroots citizens a voice in governance. However, the overwhelming victories by the ruling parties in nearly every state raise concerns about the transparency and fairness of these elections. In states where the PDP or APC is in power, their parties won every available seat. For example, the PDP secured all chairmanship positions in Adamawa, Delta, and Oyo, while the APC achieved similar dominance in Borno, Imo, and Kaduna.

These results suggest that local government elections may serve more as instruments of state control than as reflections of genuine political competition. State governors, acting as the local representatives of their parties, have substantial influence over the local electoral commissions, which are responsible for conducting these elections. This creates a system in which local elections can be manipulated to maintain the ruling party’s dominance, using the machinery of the state to secure victory. The governors, who criticize the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) when they lose at the state level, are now in a position where they can control the local electoral process to ensure their party’s continued dominance at the grassroots level.

Foucault’s notion of biopolitics—the control of populations through the regulation of political and social life—can be seen in these local government elections. The elections are not simply about governance; they are a means of maintaining political stability for the ruling elite by controlling key institutions at the local level. By securing these positions, the governors and their parties ensure that they retain influence over local resources and political allegiances, all of which are vital for consolidating power.

Positionality: Power Dynamics and Political Interests

Positionality, which refers to the social and political context that influences one’s perspective and actions, is another useful framework for analyzing the outcomes of local government elections. The political actors involved—governors, local party leaders, and voters—each occupy different positions of power and influence, and their actions can be understood in relation to these positions.

At the state level, governors are often seen as political powerhouses with significant control over local structures. When these governors lose state or national elections, they are quick to criticize the electoral process, calling it fraudulent or rigged. However, when it comes to local elections, where they have more control over the process, they are less inclined to speak out against the system. This demonstrates the positional nature of their criticism: they critique the electoral process only when it does not serve their interests. When it does, they are content to remain silent or even endorse the outcomes.

The local government elections also highlight the positional relationship between political parties and electoral outcomes. In many states, the dominance of one party is reinforced through a lack of competition. For example, in Kogi and Kaduna, the APC won all the chairmanship and councillorship positions, with no significant opposition. In Rivers State, the Action Peoples Party (APP) won a majority of the chairmanship positions, largely due to the absence of the major parties (PDP and APC) in the contest. These outcomes reflect the strategic positioning of parties in local elections: when a party dominates a state at the gubernatorial level, it often extends this dominance to local government elections by eliminating or marginalizing opposition.

Also, voters themselves are subject to positional dynamics. In many local elections, voter turnout is low, and the electorate may feel disenfranchised or powerless, believing that the outcome is predetermined by the ruling party. This sense of powerlessness is exacerbated by the patron-client relationships that often characterize local politics in Nigeria. Local political actors may secure votes through promises of patronage, jobs, or favors, positioning the electorate as passive recipients of political largesse rather than active participants in a democratic process.

The Double Standard: Critiquing Federal Elections but Benefiting from Local Control

The irony in these local government election outcomes lies in the fact that many state governors who criticize federal elections conducted by INEC for being unfair or biased are now presiding over local elections that reflect the same issues. This double standard underscores the instrumental nature of elections in Nigeria: they are seen not as opportunities for genuine democratic engagement but as tools for consolidating power when convenient.

Governors who lose governorship elections conducted by INEC often claim that the electoral process is rigged or flawed. However, when local government elections, controlled by state electoral commissions, deliver clean sweeps for their parties, these same governors remain silent. This reveals a positional hypocrisy: they criticize the system when it works against them but embrace it when it works in their favor. The state electoral bodies, which lack the independence of INEC, are often seen as extensions of the state government, and their control by the governors allows for manipulation of the electoral process to secure favorable outcomes.

A Call for Structural Reforms

The outcomes of the recent local government elections in Nigeria highlight the need for structural reforms to the country’s electoral system. The dominance of ruling parties in local elections reflects a broader issue of governance and accountability, where elections are used as instruments of control rather than mechanisms for democratic participation.

To address these challenges, reforms are needed to ensure the independence of state electoral commissions, similar to the reforms that have been implemented at the federal level with INEC. Additionally, there should be greater oversight of local government elections to prevent the undue influence of state governors and ensure that these elections reflect the will of the people rather than the interests of the ruling party.

Ultimately, the governmentality of elections in Nigeria must shift from being about controlling the population and consolidating power to promoting genuine democratic engagement. Without such reforms, local government elections will continue to be seen as tools of political manipulation, reinforcing the positionality of governors and their parties rather than empowering the electorate.