Taiwan’s Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun delivered a firm rejection on Sunday, declaring that relocating 40% of the island’s semiconductor production capacity to the United States is “impossible,” directly countering repeated demands from U.S. officials amid escalating geopolitical tensions over critical technology supply chains.
In an interview broadcast on Taiwanese television channel CTS, Cheng stated she had made the position unmistakably clear to Washington: “I have made it very clear to the United States that this is impossible.”
She emphasized that Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem—built over more than four decades of investment, innovation, and industrial clustering—cannot be dismantled or transplanted without devastating consequences for both Taiwan and global supply chains.
“Our overall capacity (in Taiwan) will only continue to grow,” Cheng said, adding that the industry would keep investing at home.
International expansion, including increased investment in the United States, would proceed only “based on the premise that we remain firmly rooted in Taiwan and continue to expand investment at home.” She ruled out any relocation of Taiwan’s science parks and core manufacturing base, while offering to share expertise in building industry clusters to help the U.S. develop its own semiconductor ecosystem.
The comments represent Taiwan’s strongest public pushback yet against U.S. pressure to onshore a substantial portion of advanced chip production. U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has repeatedly called for bringing semiconductor manufacturing back to American soil, arguing it is “illogical” to have the majority of leading-edge capacity located just 80 miles from China.
In a CNBC interview last month, Lutnick set an explicit goal for the Trump administration: achieving 40% U.S. market share in leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing by the end of its term. He previously floated a 50-50 split of chip production between Taiwan and the U.S. in a September 2025 appearance on NewsNation, warning that failure to meet relocation targets could result in tariffs on Taiwanese semiconductors rising as high as 100%. Taiwan rejected the 50-50 proposal at the time, and Cheng’s latest remarks reinforce that stance.
The island produces over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced logic chips (nodes of 7nm and below) critical for AI, smartphones, defense systems, and high-performance computing. This dominance is often described as Taiwan’s “silicon shield”—a strategic deterrent against potential Chinese aggression, as any military conflict would devastate global chip supplies.
The U.S. push is driven by national security concerns, supply chain resilience, and efforts to reduce dependence on Taiwan in the face of rising tensions with China. The CHIPS and Science Act has already allocated tens of billions in subsidies to attract investment, and TSMC—the world’s largest contract chipmaker and Taiwan’s flagship company—has committed $165 billion to build multiple fabs in Arizona.
Phase 1 production of 4nm chips is scheduled to begin in 2025, with more advanced nodes to follow. TSMC has also announced additional U.S. facilities in Texas and other states, representing the largest foreign direct investment in U.S. semiconductor history.
However, industry experts and Taiwanese officials stress that replicating Taiwan’s ecosystem—characterized by unparalleled clustering of fabs, suppliers, specialized talent, water resources, and engineering know-how—is extraordinarily difficult and time-consuming. Moving 40% of capacity would require trillions of dollars, decades of development, and the relocation of hundreds of thousands of highly skilled workers, many of whom are reluctant to leave Taiwan.
Cheng made clear that while Taiwan is willing to cooperate with the U.S. onshoring through technology sharing and investment, its core production base and science parks will remain firmly on the island. Last month, the U.S. and Taiwan reached a tariff agreement reducing duties on Taiwanese exports from 20% to 15%, providing short-term relief. Cheng described the deal as constructive but reiterated that capacity relocation is not part of the discussion.
The standoff highlights the delicate balance in U.S.-Taiwan relations. Washington seeks to “friend-shore” critical technology while Taipei views its semiconductor leadership as both an economic lifeline and a strategic asset. Analysts note that even aggressive U.S. onshoring efforts are likely to complement rather than replace Taiwan’s role in the foreseeable future, given the island’s unmatched efficiencies and the global industry’s dependence on its output.
The debate over semiconductor geography is expected to remain a central flashpoint in U.S.-China-Taiwan dynamics as negotiations continue and TSMC’s Arizona fabs ramp up, with profound implications for global technology supply chains.






