Recent reports confirm that the Pentagon has requested over $200 billion in supplemental funding from Congress to support the ongoing U.S. military campaign against Iran.
The Pentagon submitted the request to the White House for approval, with the funds intended to cover operational costs, replenish depleted munitions stockpiles; precision-guided missiles and ammunition exhausted rapidly in strikes, and sustain activities under Operation Epic Fury.
The war, now in its third week, has already cost billions—estimates suggest over $16.5 billion in the first 12 days, with daily expenses exceeding $1 billion in some analyses, driven by high-tech air and naval operations rather than ground troops. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth addressed the request during a March 19 press briefing, stating the number “could move” and emphasizing, “It takes money to kill bad guys.”
He defended it as necessary to keep the military “tippy top” and disputed notions of a quagmire, claiming the campaign is ahead of schedule with no fixed timeline for conclusion. President Trump has indicated the funding serves broader purposes beyond just Iran, while reassuring that no ground troops are planned.
The massive ask—roughly a quarter of the annual defense budget—faces significant hurdles: Congressional resistance: Even within the GOP, fiscal conservatives and some members; Rep. Lauren Boebert has publicly opposed it question the scale amid a slim House majority. Democrats largely oppose the war and are unlikely to support it.
It may require budget reconciliation to bypass Senate filibusters, but bipartisan skepticism persists over costs, strategy, and lack of detailed plans. The conflict has driven up global gas prices due to strikes on energy facilities including Iran’s South Pars gas field, adding pressure.
This comes amid escalating strikes, with reports of over 7,000 targets hit and significant Iranian naval losses (e.g., 11 submarines destroyed). The request highlights the extraordinarily high financial toll of modern precision warfare compared to past conflicts like the 2003 Iraq invasion.
Iran’s naval counter-strategies in the ongoing U.S.-led Operation Epic Fury primarily revolve around asymmetric warfare rather than direct fleet-on-fleet engagements. Iran’s conventional navy and the more agile Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) have suffered catastrophic losses—U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) reports over 120 vessels destroyed including major surface combatants, frigates like the Jamaran- and Moudge-classes, drone carriers such as IRIS Shahid Bagheri, and minelayers, rendering large portions of the surface fleet “combat ineffective” or “gone.”
Despite this, Iran has shifted to resilient, low-cost tactics designed to deny sea control in the Persian Gulf and especially the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow chokepoint where roughly 20% of global oil transits. These strategies aim to impose high costs on U.S. and allied forces through attrition, disruption of shipping, and economic pressure, rather than seeking decisive naval victories.
Iran has laid a limited number of naval mines; fewer than 10 reported so far, out of an estimated 5,000–6,000 stockpiled, focusing on moored, bottom, drifting, and limpet types. This creates a persistent threat to commercial and military shipping, forcing slower transits and higher insurance/war-risk premiums.
U.S. forces have preemptively destroyed many minelayers (16+ reported) and storage sites, but surviving mines and the risk of mass deployment remain a core deterrent. A full mining effort could severely disrupt global energy flows, though Iran has hesitated due to backlash from partners like China and economic self-harm.
Shore-Based Anti-Ship Missiles and Drones
Land-based systems and surviving drones target vessels near the strait. U.S. strikes have hit hardened sites, but remnants enable hit-and-run attacks. Low-cost kamikaze drones similar to Shaheds deplete expensive U.S. interceptors, creating an economic asymmetry.
Hundreds of small, fast missile boats and catamarans remain operational. These rely on speed, numbers, and surprise in confined waters for saturation attacks, overwhelming defenses. Pre-war doctrine emphasized overwhelming larger ships through volume rather than quality.
Midget submarines (Ghadir-class, ~18–20) and Kilo-class subs operate in shallow Gulf waters for ambushes. Unmanned surface/underwater vehicles (USVs/UUVs) serve as floating bombs or reconnaissance tools.
Threats extend to harassing or attacking commercial tankers, closing the strait de facto (declared “closed” since early March), and activating proxies (e.g., Houthis considering naval blockades). Economic warfare includes targeting energy infrastructure and raising oil prices above $100/barrel.
These approaches exploit geography (narrow strait, shallow waters) and cost disparities—cheap mines/drones vs. expensive U.S. assets. However, U.S. dominance in air and precision strikes has degraded capabilities rapidly.
Iran avoids mass escalation to preserve regime survival and avoid alienating allies, but persistent low-level threats sustain pressure on shipping and global markets.U.S. responses include mine countermeasures, escort operations, and strikes on coastal threats, with allies reluctant to fully commit due to political/economic factors.
The conflict remains dynamic, with Iran focusing on endurance and economic coercion while the U.S. pushes for decisive degradation of threats.
