OPay entered Nigeria’s market with what I describe as the Invisible Layer Strategy. The company did not come to build a sustainable motorcycle hailing business or a mass-transportation empire. Instead, ORide, OBus, OKeke and the rest were simply decoys—tools to force millions to download the OPay app. By subsidizing rides, OPay pulled users into its orbit, knowing fully that the thin margins in transportation could not sustain long-term growth. But those loss-leading ventures had one critical value: they seeded the foundation for the paytech business, which was always the real play.

How did I know? The branding of those ventures, from OBus to ORide, was designed around OPay – the fintech unit.

In Harvard Business Review, I have written on the One Oasis Strategy and Double Play Strategy, and OPay exemplified those strategies in its business in Nigeria. Yes, OPay was hemorrhaging cash on transportation, but as users began to pay, withdraw, and transact through its wallet, the company built a fortress in payments. Then came the inflection point—one million users. At that moment, OPay no longer needed to keep up appearances. The ride-hailing units were closed, and the company doubled down on payments, its original vision.

To appreciate the genius here, consider what it would have cost OPay to acquire one million quality users via traditional advertising. Instead, it spent on subsidized transport rides, but those funds bought not just eyeballs—they bought transactions, habits, and trust. Today, the ORide and OBus brands are gone, but their footprints remain in the massive OPay userbase.

The lesson is timeless: what is your invisible layer? What sacrificial venture are you running today, not because of its direct margins, but because of the customer base it can help you unlock tomorrow? In the Igbo nation, we say “onye jiri ihe ya mee ?z?, na-ach?ta ?z? ?z?” [he who uses what he has to open a path will find even greater pathways]. What is your own strategy for acquiring customers?

Comment on OPay’s Invisible Layer Strategy in Nigeria

Some have written that OPay pivoted when ORide, OBus, OKeke and others “failed”. Respectfully, that is not accurate. From the very beginning, OPay was the destination. The day ORide launched, the riders’ uniforms carried not ORide as the dominant brand but OPay. The day OKeke began, the same OPay logo was the anchor.

Look closely at the ORide bikers—you will notice something striking: the company never wanted you to remember ORide. It wanted you to remember OPay. Those transport ventures were never the endgame; they were simply transient bridges. The stable state, from Day One, was always payments. How then do you call a pivot something that was the original vision?

But let us note this: in business, the One Oasis is not fixed. As I teach in Tekedia Mini-MBA, the oasis can evolve as markets evolve. Consider Dangote Group. Years ago, when Nigeria’s rail network functioned, logistics was not the anchor of Dangote’s empire. Today, in a nation with broken supply chains, Dangote Logistics is the crown jewel. Cement, petroleum, fertilizer—they are all tied together by one thing: the unrivalled logistics capability, powered by Dangote Sinotruk West Africa which produces the trucks that move the empire. That is the heart of Dangote Group; other things are multiple plays.

That is the lesson: while OPay’s destination was clear from the start, in other businesses, the One Oasis can shift. Smart companies must master the art of knowing when the Oasis is moving—and redesign their playbook accordingly.

Comment on Feeds:

My Response: As you noted, One Oasis Strategy was at play, and we can say right now it is the OPay app. They have built many things around it. But at the beginning of this business, the one oasis was the ORide which was the most popular unit of that business. That ORide seeded the OPay via a double play. Here, a double-played product can evolve over time to become a business important unit. The One Oasis in a business is not static; things can move and shift.

For example, I think that the One Oasis in Dangote Group is logistics right now. But it was not like that when Nigeria had working railtracks which moved cargoes. Today, with Dangote logistics, the business has no competitor because you can have fuel, cement, etc …do you have means to move them? Only Dangote does in Nigeria.

Remember:  The day ORIDE launched, at the back of the uniforms, the OPay logo was there. Simply, OPay was the grand mission on Day 1.

The Invisible Layer Strategy and Why OPay Is Emerging As Nigeria’s Most Potent Fintech

The race to turn artificial intelligence into business growth is no longer confined to Big Tech. Design platforms like Canva and Figma have embedded AI into their core products, while enterprise users are experimenting with generative tools at scale. Against this backdrop, Adobe finds itself under mounting pressure to prove that its AI bets will deliver more than headlines.

ChatGPT alone has amassed roughly 700 million weekly users, a number that has redefined expectations across industries. Canva, with its “Magic” AI suite, has surged to 220 million monthly users, adding enterprise clients at a rapid clip. Figma has pushed further with agent integrations and code-aware workflows, repositioning its collaborative canvas as an AI-enabled platform.

These competitors have set a high bar for Adobe, which has rolled out Firefly inside Creative Cloud, introduced Acrobat AI Assistant, and launched GenStudio to help marketers scale content production.

The adoption numbers are undeniably strong. Adobe says 99% of the Fortune 100 now use AI features in at least one of its apps, with about 90% of its top 50 accounts tied to AI-first products. But the financial story has been less convincing. Adobe shares are down 20.6% year-to-date and more than 11% over the past six months, reflecting Wall Street’s doubts that AI will meaningfully re-accelerate growth.

Morgan Stanley added fuel to those doubts this week, downgrading Adobe to equal-weight from overweight and cutting its price target to $450 from $520. Analyst Keith Weiss argued that Adobe’s Digital Media annual recurring revenue (ARR) isn’t reflecting the pace of innovation.

“Since that upgrade, we have seen the Digital Media ARR growth directionality diverge from the pace and quality of innovation being embedded within the product portfolio,” he said.

The bank’s call emphasized three concerns: monetization is lagging adoption, rivals like Canva, Figma, and Big Tech platforms are intensifying competition, and the reduced price target—nearly 15% lower—signals lower near-term upside. Shares dropped 2.35% to $353.27 on September 24 and edged down further after hours.

Adobe executives insist the momentum is there. CEO Shantanu Narayen said this month that “AI-influenced ARR has now surpassed $5 billion, and we have already surpassed our full-year AI-first ending ARR target.” CFO Dan Durn echoed that optimism, saying AI-first products have already generated $250 million in ARR, a full quarter ahead of expectations. Yet, the aggregate numbers tell another story.

In Q2 fiscal 2025, Adobe’s Digital Media ARR climbed 12.1% year-over-year to $18.09 billion. By Q3, it reached $18.59 billion, but growth slowed to 11.7%. That deceleration has raised doubts about whether AI features are boosting upsell revenue and seat expansion enough to materially change Adobe’s growth trajectory.

The comparison with rivals underscores the tension. Canva has built an AI-powered ecosystem that is attracting enterprise teams en masse, while Figma’s integrations with coding workflows put it at the intersection of design and development. Big Tech, meanwhile, has the luxury of bundling AI into existing cloud and productivity suites, lowering customer acquisition costs. Adobe, by contrast, is trying to monetize AI primarily within its existing Creative Cloud framework, which could limit how fast the revenue needle moves.
Adobe Faces Morgan Stanley Downgrade as AI Adoption Outpaces Monetization

Adobe’s $5 billion in AI-influenced ARR shows the early promise of its strategy for bullish investors. But for skeptics, the slowdown in overall ARR growth suggests AI may prove more of a defensive tool—helping Adobe keep existing users—rather than the disruptive growth engine Wall Street has been expecting.

This means, amid the intensifying competitive landscape, Adobe now faces a dual test: proving its AI tools can fend off rivals like Canva and Figma, while also convincing Wall Street that those same tools can power meaningful, sustained revenue growth.

Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (ETI), the parent company of the Ecobank Group, has finalized its withdrawal from Mozambique after selling its entire stake in Ecobank Mozambique S.A. (EMZ) to FDH Bank Plc of Malawi.

The transaction, which received all necessary regulatory approvals, marks the conclusion of a divestment plan first announced on August 5, 2025.

“With this completion, FDH Bank Plc assumes full ownership and operational responsibility of the bank that was formerly owned in Mozambique by Ecobank,” ETI said in a statement signed by Madibinet Cisse, its Company Secretary.

The deal transfers EMZ’s four branches located across Mozambique’s largest cities, giving FDH Bank an immediate platform to expand its regional footprint.

The move is part of Ecobank’s broader strategy to streamline operations across Africa, focusing resources on high-growth markets and scaling down in areas where the Group has struggled to gain market dominance.

“This strategic decision aligns with our commitment to Ecobank’s Growth, Transformation, and Returns strategy, ensuring we remain a competitive and meaningful player across the markets in which we operate,” said Jeremy Awori, CEO of Ecobank Group.

The divestment highlights a broader trend among African financial institutions, which are increasingly rebalancing portfolios by pulling back from underperforming markets and consolidating in territories with stronger growth potential.

FDH Bank Steps In

FDH Bank Plc, a leading Malawian financial institution listed on the Malawi Stock Exchange, now takes full control of EMZ. The bank financed the deal entirely from retained earnings, a sign of its capital strength. Known for its strong digital banking infrastructure and wide-ranging services—including corporate advisory, trade finance, and global markets—FDH has positioned itself as a rising regional player.

For EMZ customers and staff, ETI stressed that operations will remain uninterrupted. Services, employee contracts, and client relationships will continue under FDH’s ownership, ensuring continuity in Mozambique’s financial sector.

Founded in 2000 as Novo Banco SARL and later rebranded in 2014 when ETI acquired it, EMZ has operated as a licensed commercial bank regulated by the Central Bank of Mozambique. Its transition to FDH ownership signals the end of Ecobank’s two-decade presence in the country.

The Mozambique exit is not Ecobank’s only recent portfolio adjustment. Last month, the Group confirmed the execution of a purchase agreement that will see Nedbank Group Ltd. sell its 21.22% stake in ETI to Bosquet Investments Ltd., the private investment vehicle of Ecobank’s Chairman, Alain Nkontchou.

That deal, advised by Enko Capital Management LLP and co-advised by Absa Bank Limited’s Corporate and Investment Banking division, underscores shifting priorities among Africa’s largest banks. For Nedbank, the move reflects a decision to concentrate on its core markets in Southern and Eastern Africa, where it directly owns and controls operations.

Comparatively, Ecobank’s move aligns with a wider pattern across Africa where large pan-African lenders such as Standard Bank, Absa, and Nedbank have had to weigh profitability against geographical spread. Nedbank itself recently pulled back from ETI to concentrate resources in Southern and Eastern Africa, reflecting a consolidation wave that is reshaping how banks allocate capital across the continent.

For Ecobank, the exit from Mozambique and the reshuffling of its shareholder base fit into its ongoing Growth, Transformation, and Returns strategy. The bank is betting that a leaner, more focused footprint will deliver stronger performance and improved returns across its 35-country network.

As FDH Bank steps into Mozambique, the acquisition could position it as a bridge between Southern and Eastern Africa’s financial hubs, strengthening competition in a market where digital transformation and cross-border services are rapidly bridging payment gaps.