A tentative framework to keep TikTok operating in the United States is moving closer to reality, with sources telling CNBC that the agreement will bring new investors together with existing stakeholders in ByteDance and should close within the next 30 to 45 days.
Oracle, which has long been floated as the U.S. partner to handle TikTok’s data and technical operations, is expected to retain its cloud role under the arrangement. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described the package as a “framework” that emerged from recent talks, and U.S. officials say commercial terms have been in place for months even as negotiations were paused and restarted amid broader trade tensions.
If finalized, the deal would be less about a blockbuster takeover and more about structuring TikTok’s U.S. operations to meet national-security demands while leaving the platform commercially viable. CNBC’s reporting suggests the capital infusion for the U.S. entity could be relatively modest and that no public-listing plan is expected for the new unit — a practical, compliance-first approach rather than a growth-driven reorganization. Oracle’s continued cloud role and the presence of both new and existing investors appear designed to reassure Washington that U.S. user data and critical infrastructure will be insulated from inappropriate foreign access.
However, the political backdrop remains volatile. Congress passed legislation in 2024 requiring ByteDance to divest TikTok or face a ban in the United States, and the White House has twice extended the compliance deadline. President Donald Trump delayed enforcement multiple times and has signaled willingness to keep granting extensions while a deal is negotiated — a process that sources say has already seen deadlines shifted several times this year. Treasury officials say the framework’s timing may hinge on diplomatic conversations between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
How this mirrors — and diverges from — earlier forced restructurings
The TikTok arrangement shares features with past U.S. actions aimed at Chinese tech companies but also departs from prior playbooks in important ways.
In the case of Huawei and ZTE, Washington relied largely on export controls, government procurement bans, and sanctions that choked off access to U.S. components and markets. Those measures were designed to hobble the companies’ global competitiveness rather than to create viable U.S.-based substitutes; the outcome was effectively exclusion from large swaths of the U.S. market rather than a negotiated, commercially managed divestment. The U.S. response to Huawei emphasized national-security containment through supply-chain restrictions and exclusion from government contracts.
By contrast, the proposed TikTok framework is a form of negotiated remediation: a tailored restructure that keeps the service running for American users while attempting to seal off perceived security risks through governance, ownership, and operational safeguards. The Oracle cloud arrangement echoes earlier proposals in which U.S. firms assumed technical custody roles to address data-residency and software-update concerns. That approach aims to preserve consumer access and investor value while meeting political requirements — a middle path between outright ban and unfettered foreign ownership.
The Ant Group episode from 2020 illustrates another relevant precedent, but one from Beijing’s side. Ant’s IPO was abruptly halted after Chinese regulators moved to restructure the fintech giant under stricter financial controls — a government-led reconfiguration to serve public-policy objectives rather than a market-driven sale or divestment. Ant’s experience shows how national authorities can force sweeping corporate re-engineering when systemic risks are at stake; in TikTok’s case, the U.S. is seeking a negotiated private-sector fix to an analogous set of national-security concerns.
Key differences are therefore strategic: Huawei and ZTE were largely shut out via export and procurement controls; Ant Group was reshaped by its home regulator; TikTok’s resolution is likely to be an international, commercially oriented compromise that leans on U.S. corporate partners and investor commitments to deliver technical and governance assurances.
Where the risks lie
Even a signed framework will not eliminate political or legal risk. Congress could demand stricter oversight or reject the structure if lawmakers judge the safeguards insufficient. Conversely, Beijing could veto or complicate an arrangement that it perceives as an expropriation of a Chinese-owned asset. And the modest size of the planned investment — if accurate — raises questions about whether the new U.S. entity will have the financial heft to stand alone down the line. Treasury officials and White House negotiators have tried to thread that needle of preserving U.S. data security while avoiding a destabilizing rupture in a platform used by tens of millions of Americans.
The bottom line: The emerging TikTok framework is best read as a hybrid response that borrows elements from prior U.S. tech containment strategies while seeking a more pragmatic, market-friendly outcome. It aims to square three competing imperatives: national security, consumer continuity, and commercial viability. How well it succeeds will hinge on the precise mechanics of ownership, governance, and operational control — and on the political winds in Washington and Beijing over the weeks ahead.
