South Korea is signaling a deeper alignment with Taiwan as both push back against U.S. plans to impose sweeping semiconductor tariffs — a tension that could reshape the global chip supply chain and geopolitical trade alliances.

Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo made headlines Monday in a radio interview when he floated the idea of cooperating with Taiwan to blunt the impact of U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed chip duties.

“Taiwan is also in negotiations, so there is room for South Korea and Taiwan to get the most favorable treatment through cooperation,” Yeo said.

His comments came just as Seoul inked a high-stakes deal with Washington. Under this agreement, the U.S. will maintain semiconductor tariffs at levels “no less favourable than terms … offered” to Taiwan for equivalent export volumes. That language was widely interpreted by South Korean officials as a direct reference to Taiwan’s own trade leverage.

U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has publicly played down the tariff issue, but South Korea’s presidential office insists the matter was central to the deal. Presidential spokesperson Kim Nam-jun confirmed that Seoul secured protection, ensuring its chip exports aren’t disadvantaged relative to Taiwan’s.

Layers of Incentive & Risk

Seoul’s urgency is underscored by stark market realities. South Korea’s semiconductor sector accounts for a massive share of its exports, and the threat of U.S. duties has pushed the government into overdrive. In April 2025, the country announced a sweeping 33 trillion won ($23.25 billion) support package to bolster the chip industry, up from 26 trillion won a year prior.

Key elements of the package include:

• 20 trillion won in low-interest loans for chipmakers (up from 17 trillion).
• Funding for R&D and workforce development — including programmes for master’s and doctoral students.
• Infrastructure improvements, most notably underground power transmission lines for semiconductor hubs in Yongin and Pyeongtaek — both key sites for Samsung and SK Hynix.
• Over $4.9 billion ($4.9B) more government capital will be injected through 2026 to ensure chip firms can weather the policy storm.

This fiscal lifeline reflects Seoul’s bet: even if U.S. tariffs bite, the long-term value of its chip industry justifies massive public investment.

A Strategic Truce — Or a Tactical Move?

To many analysts, Yeo’s call for cooperation with Taiwan is less a gesture of friendship and more a strategic maneuver. With both countries deeply exposed to U.S. chip policy, aligning could give them leverage in Washington — especially if Taiwan secures favorable terms first.

South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have all voiced concern over Trump’s tariff strategy. In coordinated commentary submitted to the U.S. Commerce Department, they warned against applying broad Section 232-style restrictions on semiconductor imports, arguing that such tariffs would raise costs for the U.S. and destabilize the supply chain.

Seoul’s trade agreement reflects that pressure. According to a fact sheet from the deal, semiconductor tariffs will be applied “at a level not disadvantageous compared with Taiwan.”

Meanwhile, Washington and Seoul plan to set up joint investment and consultative bodies to guide future projects — a clear signal that this is not a one-off trade deal, but part of a broader strategic alignment.

The Tech & Geopolitics Stakes

For Taiwan, cooperation with South Korea under these terms could help solidify its negotiating posture — especially as Taiwan is simultaneously expanding its U.S.-based manufacturing footprint. As reported, Taiwan has pledged not to transfer its most advanced chip-making technology to the U.S. under recent investment deals — a major red line for Taipei.

Yet those deals come with trade-offs. More investment in U.S.-based fabrication may raise long-term costs for Taiwan while reducing some of its geopolitical leverage — notably the so-called “silicon shield” that strengthens its security posture.

On the South Korean side, major firms are already moving aggressively. Samsung, for instance, announced plans to invest 450 trillion won ($310 billion) over five years in domestic capacity, including a new production line at Pyeongtaek and AI data centers across the country.

By doing so, Seoul is signaling that even as it cooperates with Washington, it will not abandon its home base or global technological ambitions.

Weighing the Stakes

If Seoul and Taipei can align their demands, they stand to gain a powerful negotiating bloc. But the alliance is delicate. Taiwan must guard its most advanced processes, and South Korea must prevent its domestic industry from hollowing out in favor of U.S. investment.

And from Washington’s perspective, managing this coalition is no small feat. Trump’s tariff plans — rooted in national security arguments — force the U.S. to balance its industrial ambitions against the geopolitical necessity of keeping East Asia engaged in its semiconductor supply chain.

In the coming months, the world will be on the lookout for answers to the following questions:

• Will Taiwan and South Korea formalize their cooperation publicly — or operate more quietly behind the scenes?
• How far will U.S. officials go to craft differentiated tariff terms?
• And will the billions flowing into South Korea’s chip sector today prove enough to preserve the nation’s technological edge?

The answers could reshape not just regional trade, but the global architecture of semiconductor supply chains — at a time when chips are becoming one of the most powerful currencies in geopolitics.

Four years after the People’s Republic of China unplugged the world’s largest cryptocurrency mining industry, the machines are humming again.

In a development that defies one of Beijing’s most stringent financial decrees, an underground resurrection of Bitcoin mining has clawed its way back into the global spotlight, fueled by desperate local governments, surplus energy, and the undeniable allure of a record-breaking crypto rally.

In 2021, citing threats to financial stability and energy conservation goals, Chinese regulators issued a blanket ban on cryptocurrency mining and trading. The edict was swift and seemingly effective, ostensibly driving the country’s global market share of Bitcoin mining to zero as operators fled to North America and Central Asia.

However, new data reveal that the exodus was neither permanent nor complete. According to the Hashrate Index, China has quietly reclaimed the rank of the world’s third-largest mining hub, commanding a 14% share of global activity as of late October.

Other analytics firms, such as CryptoQuant, estimate the figure is even higher, suggesting that between 15% and 20% of the network’s total computing power is once again emanating from behind the Great Firewall.

The resurgence is being driven by a pragmatic alignment of economic incentives in China’s energy-rich hinterlands. In provinces like Xinjiang and Sichuan, where renewable and coal-fired power generation often outstrips the transmission capacity of the national grid, “trapped” energy is finding a buyer of last resort.

Wang, a private miner operating in Xinjiang who requested anonymity, described a system where electricity that cannot be exported is simply consumed on-site in the form of cryptographic hashing. He noted that new projects are currently under construction, following the immutable law of the industry: miners migrate to where the electrons are cheapest.

This activity is often shielded by a veil of “digital infrastructure” investment. Sources quoted by Reuters say that a recent boom in data center construction—encouraged by cash-strapped local governments looking to stimulate their economies—has created a glut of computing power and electricity capacity. While ostensibly built for conventional cloud computing or AI, some of these facilities are quietly pivoting to the more immediate liquidity of Bitcoin mining to monetize their over-investment.

The trend is perhaps most visible in the financial disclosures of the hardware manufacturers themselves. Canaan Inc., the world’s second-largest maker of Bitcoin mining rigs, has seen a dramatic shift in its revenue geography. After its China sales collapsed to just 2.8% of total revenue in 2022 following the ban, the figure rebounded to 30.3% last year.

Sources with direct knowledge of the company’s books indicate that in the second quarter of this year, China’s contribution surged to more than 50% of Canaan’s sales. The company attributes this to a mix of U.S. tariff uncertainty driving machines back to domestic buyers and the sheer profitability of mining as Bitcoin hit record highs in October.

The macro-political environment has also emboldened these clandestine operators. The rebound coincides with a surge in digital asset prices, driven in part by U.S. President Donald Trump’s pro-crypto policies and a deepening global distrust of the U.S. dollar.

For Chinese investors, Bitcoin remains a potent hedge. Patrick Gruhn, CEO of Perpetuals.com, argues that this resurgence is a signal of “Chinese policy flexibility,” suggesting that Beijing’s enforcement softens significantly when economic incentives in specific regions become too strong to ignore.

While neither the National Development and Reform Commission nor the Xinjiang government has acknowledged this shift, the regulatory ice appears to be thawing in subtle ways. Some analysts point to Hong Kong’s recent implementation of a stablecoin bill in August as a proxy for Beijing’s evolving stance.

China may be tacitly acknowledging the utility of the asset class by allowing its financial gateway to compete with the U.S. in regulated crypto markets. Legal experts, such as Liu Honglin of Man Kun Law Firm, suggest that a total eradication of the industry was always an impossibility. He predicts a gradual loosening of restrictions, noting that the profitability of the sector makes it impossible to extinguish completely.

For now, the ban remains officially on the books. Yet, in the mountains of Sichuan and the deserts of Xinjiang, the hum of the cooling fans suggests that China has realized it cannot afford to leave the future of digital finance entirely to the West.