Apple on Wednesday confirmed that JPMorgan Chase will become the new issuer of the Apple Card, formally ending its high-profile but troubled partnership with Goldman Sachs and handing the largest U.S. bank a major foothold in Apple’s consumer finance ecosystem.
The move is seen as a decisive turning point in its consumer finance strategy and draws a clear line under Goldman Sachs’ costly experiment in mass-market banking.
The transition, which Apple says could take up to 24 months, will be deliberately gradual. Apple stressed that nothing changes for customers in the near term: the card will continue to run on the Mastercard network, existing cardholders do not need to take any action, and new applicants can continue to apply under the same terms. That emphasis on continuity reflects Apple’s sensitivity to user experience, a defining feature of the product since its launch in 2019.
Behind the scenes, however, the economics and strategic implications are significant. JPMorgan said the deal will bring more than $20 billion in Apple Card balances onto its books, instantly making it one of the largest co-branded card wins in the U.S. market in recent years. For the country’s biggest bank, the appeal lies not just in volume but in access to Apple’s affluent, digitally engaged customer base, many of whom are already embedded in the iPhone and Apple Pay ecosystem. JPMorgan has deep experience running large credit card programmes and absorbing portfolios, giving it a scale advantage that Goldman never had in consumer lending.
But the exit underscores how far Goldman Sachs’ ambitions in consumer banking have been rolled back. The firm entered the Apple partnership as a bold attempt to diversify away from its traditional reliance on trading and dealmaking. Instead, the card became emblematic of the challenges Goldman faced in retail finance: higher-than-expected credit losses, operational missteps, and intense regulatory scrutiny over billing practices and customer complaints.
The financial cost of the divorce is steep. The Wall Street Journal reported that Goldman is offloading the Apple Card balances at a roughly $1 billion discount, crystallizing losses that had been building for years. Goldman has already said it expects a $2.2 billion provision for credit losses in the fourth quarter of 2025 linked to the forward purchase commitment, a reminder that even unwinding the partnership comes with a heavy price tag.
The Apple Card itself was designed to challenge industry norms. When it launched in 2019, Apple and Goldman pitched it as a consumer-friendly alternative, with no late fees, no penalty interest rates, and daily cash-back rewards seamlessly integrated into the iPhone Wallet app. The product aligned neatly with Apple’s broader push into services, which now spans payments, savings accounts, and buy-now-pay-later offerings.
Yet that same design philosophy also constrained profitability. The absence of penalty fees, combined with Apple’s insistence on tight control over the user interface and customer communications, limited Goldman’s ability to manage risk and maximize returns in the way traditional card issuers do. Over time, those tensions became harder to ignore, especially as losses mounted and regulators took a closer look at Goldman’s consumer operations.
JPMorgan’s entry suggests Apple has recalibrated its approach. Rather than retreating from credit cards, Apple appears to be choosing a partner with the balance sheet, compliance infrastructure, and card-lending expertise to make the economics work at scale. Some analysts believe the deal complements its dominant position in U.S. consumer banking and reinforces its strategy of embedding itself deeper into everyday digital payments.
The drawn-out transition period also denotes the complexity of moving millions of customer accounts, data systems, and regulatory obligations without disrupting service. Such migrations are fraught with operational risk, and both Apple and JPMorgan have strong incentives to ensure a smooth handover that preserves trust in the Apple brand.
More broadly, the shift highlights a recurring theme in Big Tech’s relationship with finance. Technology companies can design compelling, user-centric financial products, but the underlying business of lending remains capital-intensive, highly regulated, and unforgiving of missteps. Apple’s experience with Goldman shows that brand power alone does not guarantee success in consumer credit.
Now, all eyes will be on how JPMorgan can turn the Apple Card into a consistently profitable franchise, and whether Apple continues to expand its financial services ambitions. Goldman, on the other hand, is expected to close the chapter, absorb the losses, and refocus on its core businesses after one of the most expensive detours in its history.
