Germany’s AfD Designation Impact Hinges on How Courts, Voters, and International Actors Respond

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May 4, 2025

Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), officially classified the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party as a “confirmed right-wing extremist” organization. This designation, based on a 1,100-page report, cites the party’s ethnically and ancestrally defined concept of “the people,” which the BfV says devalues entire population groups, particularly migrants and Muslims, and violates human dignity.

The decision allows for increased surveillance, including the use of informants and interception of communications, and could impact the party’s public funding and ability to attract members. The AfD, which came second in the February 2025 federal election with 20.8% of the vote and 152 seats in the Bundestag, condemned the move as a politically motivated attack on democracy and vowed to challenge it in court.

The designation has sparked debate in Germany. Some politicians, like SPD’s Manuela Schwesig and Lars Klingbeil, argue it justifies excluding the AfD from key parliamentary roles and even pursuing a ban, though outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz cautioned against rushing to outlaw the party. A ban would require approval from the Bundestag, Bundesrat, or the Constitutional Court and evidence that the AfD actively undermines Germany’s democratic order. Critics, including AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, claim the label is a smear to discredit a party that polls show is among Germany’s most popular, especially in eastern states where it has already been classified as extremist.

Internationally, the decision drew criticism from U.S. figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who called it “tyranny in disguise,” and Vice President JD Vance, who likened it to “rebuilding the Berlin Wall.” Elon Musk, who endorsed the AfD before the election, warned that banning it would be an “extreme attack on democracy.” Germany’s Foreign Ministry defended the move, stating it reflects lessons from history about stopping right-wing extremism.

The AfD, founded in 2013 as a Euroskeptic party, shifted to an anti-migration stance after 2015, gaining traction amid voter frustration with immigration and economic issues. Its designation as extremist could complicate its role in the new parliament under incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz, with debates ongoing about whether to treat it as a standard opposition party or further isolate it.

The designation of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as a “confirmed right-wing extremist” organization by Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) on May 2, 2025, carries significant implications across political, legal, social, and international dimensions. The extremist label justifies excluding the AfD from key parliamentary roles, such as committee chairs or leadership positions, as advocated by politicians like SPD’s Manuela Schwesig. This could limit the party’s influence in the Bundestag, despite its 20.8% vote share and 152 seats in the February 2025 election.

The designation reinforces the “firewall” policy of mainstream parties, preventing coalitions with the AfD. This complicates government formation, especially in eastern states where the AfD is strong, potentially leading to unstable minority governments or grand coalitions. The label fuels discussions about banning the AfD, though this requires proof of actively undermining democracy and approval from the Bundestag, Bundesrat, or Constitutional Court. A failed ban attempt could backfire, strengthening the AfD’s narrative of victimhood and boosting its popularity.

The BfV can now use intrusive measures like informants, wiretaps, and monitoring of communications, potentially disrupting AfD operations but also risking accusations of overreach. The designation may lead to reduced public funding, as seen in past cases with extremist groups, and deter potential members or employees due to stigma and legal scrutiny.

The AfD’s vow to fight the designation in court could delay or overturn the label, as seen in a 2021 case where a lower classification was upheld. Prolonged legal battles may keep the issue in the public eye, rallying AfD supporters. The label deepens Germany’s political divide, particularly in eastern states where the AfD enjoys strong support. Supporters may view it as an attack on democratic choice, while opponents see it as a necessary defense against extremism, further entrenching societal tensions.

The AfD’s narrative of being unfairly targeted could resonate with disillusioned voters, potentially increasing its support, especially if economic or migration issues persist. Polls already show the AfD as one of Germany’s most popular parties. The designation may pressure mainstream parties to adopt tougher stances on migration or security to recapture AfD voters, risking a rightward shift in German politics.

International Implications

U.S. figures like Marco Rubio, JD Vance, and Elon Musk have condemned the move as undemocratic, potentially straining Germany’s relations with a Republican-led U.S. administration. Such criticism could embolden other far-right movements globally to frame similar measures as authoritarian. Germany’s approach may inspire other European countries grappling with far-right parties, like France’s National Rally or Italy’s Brothers of Italy, to adopt similar surveillance or exclusion tactics, though it could also deter them if backlash grows.

The AfD’s designation may strengthen ties with other far-right groups in Europe, who could use it to rally against perceived “establishment” suppression, boosting cross-border far-right networks. Heavy-handed measures risk eroding trust in democratic institutions if perceived as targeting a popular party unfairly, potentially fueling populist narratives.

The party’s ability to capitalize on grievances could make it more resilient, as seen after previous classifications in eastern states. Its strong voter base suggests it will remain a significant force unless underlying issues like immigration or economic discontent are addressed. Germany must balance combating extremism with preserving democratic freedoms. Overreach could set precedents for targeting other political groups, while underreaction risks normalizing far-right rhetoric.i

Ethena Labs Partners With TON For USDe Stablecoin Integration

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Paul Ugbede Godwin

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May 4, 2025

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Ethena Labs has partnered with The Open Network (TON) to integrate its USDe stablecoin and Staked USDe (sUSDe), rebranded as tsUSDe, into Telegram’s ecosystem, reaching over one billion users. Announced on May 1, 2025, at Token2049 in Dubai, this move allows Telegram users to access dollar-denominated savings, payments, and DeFi applications directly within the app. The integration supports both custodial (Telegram’s native wallet) and non-custodial wallets (e.g., TON Space, Tonkeeper) and is powered by LayerZero’s interoperability protocol.

Eligible tsUSDe holders in major TON wallets can earn a 10% annual percentage yield (APY) in TON tokens on balances up to 10,000 tsUSDe, alongside Ethena’s standard rewards.
The rollout, set to occur in phases throughout May 2025, includes support for TON’s DeFi ecosystem, aiming to boost adoption in emerging markets across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Ethena’s USDe, with a market cap of $4.7–$6 billion, ranks as the third or fourth largest stablecoin, behind Tether’s USDT, Circle’s USDC, and sometimes Sky’s USDS.

This expansion aligns with Ethena’s 2025 roadmap to compete with Tether by offering neobank-like services, including potential TON-based debit cards and Apple Pay integration. The partnership has driven a 3.5% rise in Ethena’s ENA token to $0.033 and a 1.9% increase in Toncoin to $3.22, though TON’s network activity has faced declines since mid-2024.

Ethena’s synthetic dollar approach carries risks, as analysts note potential yield compression in volatile markets, but its open collateral and risk management aim to ensure stability. This move could redefine stablecoin access, leveraging Telegram’s massive user base for mainstream crypto adoption. The integration of Ethena’s USDe stablecoin into Telegram’s TON blockchain carries significant implications across adoption, DeFi, market dynamics, and risks.

Mass Adoption Potential: Telegram’s 1 billion+ user base provides a massive platform for mainstream stablecoin adoption, particularly in emerging markets (Asia, Africa, Latin America) where mobile messaging apps dominate. Seamless access to USDe for savings, payments, and DeFi within Telegram could drive crypto use among non-technical users, bridging Web2 and Web3.

DeFi Ecosystem Growth: TON’s DeFi ecosystem gains a major stablecoin with USDe’s $4.7–$6 billion market cap. The 10% APY incentive for tsUSDe holders and integration with wallets like TON Space and Tonkeeper could boost liquidity in TON-based DeFi protocols, fostering new applications and increasing transaction volume.

Competitive Pressure on Stablecoins: Ethena’s expansion challenges Tether (USDT) and Circle (USDC), especially with plans for neobank-like services (e.g., debit cards, Apple Pay). USDe’s synthetic dollar model, if perceived as stable, could erode Tether’s dominance in markets prioritizing accessibility and yield.

Market and Token Impact: The partnership has already lifted Ethena’s ENA token (+3.5% to $0.033) and Toncoin (+1.9% to $3.22). Increased USDe usage on TON could sustain upward pressure on ENA, while TON’s network activity may rebound from its 2024 decline, enhancing Toncoin’s value proposition.

Regulatory and Stability Risks: USDe’s synthetic dollar, reliant on collateral and yield strategies, faces risks of yield compression or instability in volatile markets. Regulatory scrutiny of stablecoins could intensify, especially as Ethena targets mainstream financial services. TON’s custodial wallet reliance may also raise concerns about user control and compliance.

Interoperability and Innovation: LayerZero’s role enables cross-chain functionality, potentially setting a precedent for stablecoin integrations across other blockchains. This could accelerate innovation in DeFi and payment systems, but also introduces technical risks tied to interoperability protocols. This move could redefine stablecoin accessibility and DeFi on TON, but its success hinges on managing risks and sustaining user trust in USDe’s stability.

Worldcoin Officially Launches in the United States

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Paul Ugbede Godwin

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May 4, 2025

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Worldcoin, co-founded by Sam Altman, officially launched in the United States on May 1, 2025, as confirmed by multiple sources. The launch enables Americans to verify their World ID in six key cities—Atlanta, Austin, Los Angeles, Miami, Nashville, and San Francisco—using NVIDIA-powered Orbs available at standalone World Spaces and partner locations like Razer stores.

Users can download the World App to access the full experience, including anonymous human verification and the ability to claim Worldcoin (WLD) airdrops, though token distribution is restricted in certain areas like New York due to regulatory constraints.

The U.S. expansion follows international rollouts and comes with a $300,000 developer rewards program to boost platform innovation. There’s also speculation about a potential Coinbase listing, which could increase WLD’s liquidity and adoption. However, the project faces regulatory scrutiny, similar to challenges in Spain, over its biometric data collection practices, despite claims of privacy preservation through zero-knowledge proofs.

Worldcoin’s use of iris-scanning Orbs to create unique World IDs raises concerns about biometric data collection. Despite claims of privacy via zero-knowledge proofs, regulatory bodies may scrutinize how data is stored and used, especially given past investigations in countries like Spain. Public skepticism, as seen in some X posts, highlights fears of surveillance or data misuse.

The U.S. has stringent data protection and cryptocurrency regulations. Restrictions on WLD token distribution in states like New York suggest compliance hurdles. The SEC and other agencies could impose further oversight, impacting Worldcoin’s scalability and tokenomics, especially if WLD is classified as a security. The launch could drive cryptocurrency adoption, particularly if WLD gets listed on exchanges like Coinbase, boosting liquidity. The $300,000 developer rewards program may spur innovation, creating new use cases for Worldcoin’s identity verification in DeFi, governance, or universal basic income experiments. However, token value volatility remains a risk.

Worldcoin’s goal of providing a global, decentralized identity system could reshape online authentication, reducing reliance on centralized platforms. Success in the U.S. could accelerate adoption in other markets, but failure to address privacy concerns may limit trust and uptake.

The project may deepen debates over digital inclusion versus surveillance. While Worldcoin aims to onboard underserved populations, its tech-heavy approach could exclude those without access to smartphones or Orbs. Public sentiment on X shows a split—some view it as revolutionary, others as dystopian. As a major market, the U.S. launch could set a benchmark for Worldcoin’s global rollout. Regulatory outcomes here may influence policies elsewhere, while adoption rates could signal the project’s long-term viability.

These implications hinge on Worldcoin’s ability to balance innovation with trust and compliance in a complex U.S. landscape. The societal divide surrounding Worldcoin’s U.S. launch stems from conflicting views on its promise of decentralized identity versus concerns about privacy, accessibility, and control. Supporters argue Worldcoin could provide a universal identity system, enabling access to services like crypto, banking, or governance for underserved populations without traditional IDs. This aligns with its mission to create a global, equitable digital economy.

Enthusiasts, including some developers on X, see Worldcoin’s $300,000 rewards program and potential Coinbase listing as catalysts for building decentralized apps, enhancing financial systems, or testing universal basic income models. Advocates highlight Worldcoin’s use of zero-knowledge proofs, which aim to verify identities without storing sensitive biometric data, as a step toward secure, anonymous authentication.

Skeptics, reflected in critical X posts, fear that iris-scanning Orbs and biometric data collection could lead to surveillance or data breaches, despite privacy assurances. Past regulatory scrutiny in Spain fuels distrust. The tech-heavy approach—requiring smartphones, app downloads, and access to Orbs in only six U.S. cities—may exclude rural or low-income groups, undermining inclusivity claims and favoring urban, tech-savvy users.

Critics question the decentralization narrative, pointing to Worldcoin’s corporate backing and restricted token distribution (e.g., in New York) as signs of centralized influence, potentially replicating existing power imbalances. The divide mirrors broader tensions between those who embrace blockchain and AI-driven solutions as liberating and those who view them as tools for control or exclusion. X posts show some hailing Worldcoin as “revolutionary” while others label it “dystopian.”

Some Americans may see Worldcoin’s global ambitions as disconnected from local needs, especially in a regulatory environment wary of crypto and data privacy. This divide could shape Worldcoin’s adoption. Proponents may drive early uptake among crypto enthusiasts, but critics’ concerns—especially around privacy and equity—could slow mainstream acceptance unless addressed transparently. Bridging the gap requires clear communication, broader accessibility, and robust privacy safeguards.

Italy’s PM Meloni Expressed Optimism About Building Strong Ties with New German Chancellor

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Paul Ugbede Godwin

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May 4, 2025

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Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has expressed optimism about building strong relations with Friedrich Merz, the conservative German politician set to become chancellor on May 6, 2025. Meloni, who leads a right-wing government in Rome, has been in contact with Merz in recent weeks, following a meeting ahead of Germany’s February 2025 elections. She conveyed confidence in their future cooperation to Italy’s Adnkronos news agency, highlighting shared views, particularly on the EU’s Green Deal and competitiveness.

The two leaders are expected to meet at upcoming international summits, and Merz is slated to visit Rome shortly after taking office. Meloni’s positive outlook is further bolstered by her established ties with U.S. President Donald Trump, which she believes could complement Merz’s transatlantic priorities.

The EU Green Deal is a comprehensive policy framework launched by the European Union in 2019 to make Europe climate-neutral by 2050. It aims to transform the EU’s economy and society through ambitious environmental, economic, and social reforms. Achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, with a 55% reduction target by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.

Promoting renewable energy, improving energy efficiency, and phasing out fossil fuels. Implementing a circular economy, reducing waste, and fostering green technologies. Protecting ecosystems, halting biodiversity loss, and restoring degraded environments. Reforming food systems via the Farm to Fork Strategy to promote eco-friendly farming and reduce pesticide use. Expanding low-emission mobility, including electric vehicles and sustainable aviation fuels.

Mobilizing at least €1 trillion through the EU budget, private investments, and mechanisms like the Just Transition Fund to support regions dependent on fossil fuels. Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s Prime Minister, and Friedrich Merz, Germany’s incoming chancellor, have expressed shared concerns about the EU Green Deal’s impact on economic competitiveness. Meloni has criticized certain aspects, like the 2035 ban on internal combustion engine vehicles, arguing it burdens industries, particularly Italy’s automotive sector.

Merz, leading the CDU, also emphasizes balancing environmental goals with economic growth, advocating for adjustments to Green Deal policies to protect German industries like manufacturing. Their alignment suggests potential cooperation to reshape or moderate the Green Deal’s implementation, prioritizing pragmatism and transatlantic coordination, especially with figures like U.S. President Donald Trump, who favors deregulation.

The shared stance of Giorgia Meloni and Friedrich Merz on the EU Green Deal, coupled with their intent to foster good relations, carries significant implications for the EU, transatlantic ties, and global climate policy. Meloni and Merz’s focus on competitiveness suggests they may push for revising Green Deal targets, such as the 2035 internal combustion engine ban or stringent emissions rules, to ease burdens on industries like Italy’s automotive sector and Germany’s manufacturing base.

Their influence could lead to more flexible timelines or exemptions, prioritizing economic stability over rapid decarbonization, potentially delaying aspects of the 2050 climate-neutrality goal. Their push for reform may clash with progressive EU states (e.g., Nordic countries) and the European Commission, risking divisions within the EU on climate policy. By advocating for policies that safeguard jobs in automotive, manufacturing, and energy-intensive industries, Meloni and Merz could bolster economic resilience in Italy and Germany, the EU’s second- and third-largest economies.

Slowing Green Deal measures might delay the shift to green technologies, potentially ceding leadership in renewables or electric vehicles to competitors like China or the U.S. A focus on affordability could lead to prolonged reliance on fossil fuels, impacting energy prices and security, especially given global market volatility. Meloni’s ties with U.S. President Donald Trump, combined with Merz’s transatlantic focus, could align EU policies with a U.S. administration skeptical of aggressive climate mandates.

This might foster trade agreements or energy partnerships but weaken global climate commitments. If the EU softens its Green Deal under Meloni and Merz’s influence, it risks losing its position as a global climate leader, especially if the U.S. under Trump prioritizes deregulation over emissions cuts. Meloni (Brothers of Italy) and Merz (CDU) represent conservative forces gaining ground in Europe. Their collaboration could embolden other right-leaning governments (e.g., in Hungary or Poland) to challenge EU policies, shifting the bloc’s political balance.

As Germany’s new chancellor, Merz’s alignment with Meloni could reshape the traditional Franco-German axis, with Italy gaining influence. However, this risks friction with France’s Emmanuel Macron, who supports a strong Green Deal. If Germany and Italy, key EU players, dilute the Green Deal, it could undermine global climate efforts, especially ahead of COP30 in 2025, where updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are due.

A less ambitious EU stance might discourage other major economies (e.g., India, Brazil) from strengthening their climate pledges, slowing progress toward Paris Agreement goals. By prioritizing jobs and affordability, Meloni and Merz could strengthen domestic support among voters concerned about the economic costs of green transitions, countering far-right and populist critiques.

Environmental activists and younger voters may criticize any rollback of Green Deal measures, potentially fueling protests or boosting Green parties in future elections. Meloni and Merz’s collaboration could reshape the EU Green Deal into a more industry-friendly framework, aligning with transatlantic priorities under a Trump-led U.S. While this may protect short-term economic interests and strengthen their political standing, it risks delaying climate goals, straining EU unity, and diminishing the bloc’s global environmental leadership.

Nigeria’s Most Consequential Policy: Financialization without Factories

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Ndubuisi Ekekwe

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May 4, 2025

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Buhari IBB — Nigerian past and present rulers

I was still in Secondary Technical School Ovim when IBB was the president, and as a village kid, my problem was never food. You were guaranteed one loaf of Ezioma bread (15 kobo) in the morning. On the days after the main Oriendu Market, you could upgrade to Our Society bread. Our Society bread was “imported” from Enugu, from the bakery of Chief Umunna, who never forgot his village even though he was serving Enugu people.

I do conclude that IBB was a good operator even though he scaled many bad economic policies in Nigeria. I mean he anchored Abuja, 3rd Mainland Bridge, etc. Yet, he messed up with SAP (structural adjustment programme), and in the bid to recover, he liberated the banking & financial sector at scale, without connecting it to manufacturing. Yes, Nigeria became a trading floor with margins!

Today, from GTBank to Zenith Bank, and beyond, some of the leading banks in Nigeria were created within 1989 to 1993, and a policy framework made that possible. Just like that, the financialization of Nigeria began, and that started the erosion of the core pillars of Nigeria. IBB made finance better but ignored manufacturing! Why build factories when you can add your “percentage” on a financial transaction?

The late 1970s and early 1980s:

The illusion has been that the late 1970s and early 1980s were great because we had the oil boom. Not really, as we still have an oil boom today. In the 1980s, we pumped about 400,000 bpd at about $36 per barrel. Today, we do close to 1.2 million bpd at close to $80 . Even if you adjust for population, Nigeria has more resources today than the late 1970s! (Under constant US dollar, we made $14.4m daily vs $96m today which under constant currency is a 6.7 factor. Population in 1981 was 75 million for today’s 210 million which is a factor of 2.3. In other words, we have scaled oil revenue faster than population, meaning the boom of today is greater).

So, do not say the late 1970s and early 1980s were better because of oil. Something is missing and here is it: Nigeria has stopped making things in Nigeria. Today, we have financialized Nigeria’s economy, as banking and financial services rose, and manufacturing faded. In the 1980s, the known entrepreneurs in Kano, Aba, Abeokuta, etc made things. Today, we grow apps, and have mastered how to pay, receive and move money!

Simply, Nigeria’s problem is not that oil money has stopped; our problem is that post the 1980s SAP, our economy was reconfigured with finance houses, banking, etc and people found out that you could invest N1,000 and wait for a 20% return without doing anything. With that financial engineering everywhere, everyone joined the club and starved the manufacturing (old, modern, hybrid and services) sector. Of course, with easy money, productivity dropped, corruption demons grew, and a nation began the descent.

How do I know? Nigeria creates policies for financial services at more than 8:1 which means for one policy on manufacturing, we have 8 on financialization. Do you want the test? Tell me the last 8 things you know about the banking circulars and remind me of one you know for the manufacturers. You have no chance for the manufacturers but you can list those bank-focused policies.

From the Tang dynasty to the Song dynasty to modern America, and after looking at 2000 years of global GDPs, I have noticed one thing: such financial engineering unlinked to making things will destroy any decent economy.

The Financialization of Nigeria

Let’s talk about the financialization of Nigeria. Since the 1980s, despite greater resources, our economy has shifted dramatically away from making things and heavily towards financial services. This pivot, accelerated by SAP, has created a policy environment favoring finance over manufacturing at an alarming 8:1 ratio. The consequence? A drop in productivity, a rise in corruption, and frankly, a national descent. We must remember that true advancement comes from building and producing, not just shuffling finances.

On a related note, let’s consider the rise of Bureaux de Change (BDCs) and POS agents. The introduction of BDCs back in 1989, and the more recent explosion of POS businesses, highlight this financialization. It’s concerning when POS agents effectively “tax” citizens as the Naira becomes a commodity in their hands. The Central Bank’s own data shows over 90% of cash in circulation is outside banks, significantly flowing through the POS system.

To address this, I firmly believe we need a strategic recalibration. National banks must have a presence in all local government areas to reduce the reliance and cost associated with POS agents. Furthermore, the operations of BDCs should be fully digitized, with a long-term vision of integrating their functions into the banking system itself. Nigeria’s prosperity hinges on a return to a productive, manufacturing-based economy, supported by a financial sector that truly serves that purpose, not the other way around.

The Financialization of Nigeria and the Challenges Ahead