The Trump administration released its updated global security roadmap, a key policy document outlining national defense priorities for the coming years.
Notably absent from this document is any explicit reference to the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” (CVID) of North Korea—a cornerstone of US policy toward Pyongyang since the 2018 Singapore summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un.
This omission has sparked widespread speculation that Washington is deprioritizing the long-stalled denuclearization goal in favor of pragmatic diplomacy, potentially paving the way for renewed high-level talks as early as 2026.
During Trump’s first term (2017–2021), the US pursued an aggressive “maximum pressure” campaign, combining sanctions, military exercises with South Korea, and personal diplomacy with Kim.
The three Trump-Kim summits produced vague commitments to denuclearization but collapsed over demands for sanctions relief versus verifiable steps from North Korea. The Biden administration maintained CVID as the baseline but saw no progress, with North Korea conducting over 100 missile tests since 2022, advancing its ICBM and submarine-launched capabilities.
The New Roadmap
Released amid escalating US-China tensions and Russia’s deepened ties with North Korea including arms transfers for Ukraine war support, the document emphasizes threats from China, Iran, and non-state actors while redirecting focus to “extended deterrence” alliances with allies like South Korea and Japan.
North Korea’s nuclear program—now estimated to include 50–60 warheads and missiles capable of reaching the US mainland—is not addressed, marking a departure from the 2017 National Security Strategy, which labeled it a “second-tier” existential threat.
Both the US and South Korean governments quickly clarified on December 8 that no formal policy shift has occurred and denuclearization “remains the ultimate goal.” However, analysts interpret the silence as deliberate, reflecting Trump’s personal affinity for Kim and a desire to avoid provoking Pyongyang while testing waters for “peaceful coexistence” without preconditions.
Hong Min, a senior researcher at South Korea’s Korea Institute for National Unification, described it as a “conscious intent” to revive dialogue by sidelining the divisive CVID demand. Trump’s Hints at Renewed TalksTrump has long touted his “special relationship” with Kim, once claiming they “fell in love” over letters exchanged post-2019.
In recent months, he’s amplified signals of openness :September 2025 Overture from Kim: During a Supreme People’s Assembly speech, Kim Jong Un explicitly invited talks, stating: “If the US drops its hollow obsession with denuclearization and wants to pursue peaceful coexistence… there is no reason for us not to sit down.”
He added fond personal memories of Trump, contrasting this with rejection of dialogue with South Korea, which he views as a “foreign enemy.” Trump’s Response interviews and social media posts since his January 2025 inauguration, Trump has echoed this, saying he’s “proactive” about meeting Kim again “to get something done” and floated ideas like economic incentives without tying them to disarmament.
At the October 2025 APEC summit in South Korea, Trump reportedly raised North Korea in side talks with Xi Jinping, though no breakthroughs emerged. SSome analysts ramed it as a pragmatic win for de-escalation, while critics called it a concession to a “nuclear rogue state.”
Experts like Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies see it as lowering hostility to enable 2026 summits, possibly focusing on arms control (e.g., missile test freezes) or confidence-building measures rather than full disarmament.
Kim views such talks as regime validation, especially with North Korea’s arsenal now “irreversible” in his words. Dropping CVID might erode US credibility with allies South Korea fears abandonment; Japan worries about missile threats and embolden proliferators globally.
North Korea’s ties with Russia and China give it leverage, but Trump could counter with sanctions relief tied to verifiable limits on long-range strikes. With US-China rivalry dominating the roadmap, North Korea becomes a secondary lever—potentially traded for concessions on Taiwan or trade.
If talks materialize, they could echo the “freeze-for-freeze” proposals floated by China/Russia in 2017, halting tests in exchange for scaled-back US-South Korea drills. While official channels downplay the change, the roadmap’s silence speaks volumes.
Trump appears willing to meet Kim on equal footing, betting his rapport can yield stability without the “absurd obsession” of total disarmament. Whether this leads to de-escalation or a nuclear fait accompli remains the trillion-dollar question—literally, given the economic carrots Trump has dangled.
