Egypt and Qatar have moved to deepen their energy partnership at a time when gas supply security is becoming increasingly critical for Cairo, signing a memorandum of understanding that formalizes cooperation on liquefied natural gas sales and imports and positions Qatar as a key supplier ahead of the summer demand peak.

The development is seen as a clear signal that Cairo is recalibrating its gas strategy after a sharp reversal of fortunes that has seen Africa’s largest gas producer increasingly reliant on imports to keep the lights on.

The memorandum of understanding covers LNG sales and imports, with specific provisions for supplying Qatari cargoes to Egypt’s Ain Sokhna and Damietta ports. QatarEnergy said the agreement includes the delivery of up to 24 LNG cargoes during the upcoming summer, a critical period when electricity consumption spikes and gas shortages have, in recent years, triggered rolling power cuts and public frustration.

At its core, the deal reflects the widening gap between Egypt’s gas supply and demand. Once buoyed by major offshore discoveries and rising output, Egypt had positioned itself as a regional energy hub, exporting LNG to Europe and neighboring markets while processing gas from Israel and, potentially, Cyprus. That ambition has been steadily undermined since late 2022, when domestic production began to decline.

Official data illustrates the challenge. Egypt produced 3,635 million cubic meters of gas in October last year, up slightly from September but still well below the 3,851 million cubic meters recorded in the same month of 2024, according to figures from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative. The decline has persisted even as demand continues to rise, driven by population growth, industrial expansion, and a power sector that depends heavily on gas-fired generation.

This imbalance has forced Egypt into an uncomfortable position. Instead of exporting surplus LNG, Cairo has increasingly had to compete on the global market for cargoes, often at premium prices, while also boosting pipeline imports from Israel and planning future inflows from Cyprus. The cost of these imports has strained public finances at a time when Egypt is already grappling with inflation, currency pressures, and a broader economic reform programme.

Against that backdrop, the agreement with Qatar offers a measure of stability. Qatar is the world’s largest LNG exporter, with vast reserves and a well-established shipping and trading network. Securing up to 24 cargoes for the summer gives Egypt a clearer line of sight on supply during peak demand months, reducing the risk of sudden shortages or emergency purchases on the spot market.

The choice of Ain Sokhna and Damietta as delivery points is also telling. Ain Sokhna hosts Egypt’s floating storage and regasification units, which allow LNG imports to be quickly converted back into gas for domestic use. Damietta, long associated with LNG exports, underscores how Egypt’s infrastructure is being repurposed as circumstances change. Facilities once built to ship gas abroad are now increasingly critical to meeting domestic needs.

For Qatar, the deal strengthens its footprint in a strategically important market. As Doha presses ahead with massive capacity expansions at the North Field, it has been keen to secure long-term and medium-term outlets for its LNG. Egypt, with its large population, growing energy demand, and established infrastructure, represents an attractive partner, particularly within the Middle East and North Africa region.

The agreement also fits into a broader regional pattern of energy cooperation. Middle Eastern producers and consumers are increasingly leaning on intra-regional trade to manage volatility in global markets and hedge against geopolitical shocks. Thus, sourcing LNG from Qatar may prove more predictable for Egypt than relying solely on spot cargoes that are vulnerable to swings in Asian or European demand.

Still, the deal highlights the distance between Egypt’s current reality and its stated ambitions. Petroleum Minister Karim Badawi said last week that Egypt plans to achieve self-sufficiency in oil and gas, according to a cabinet statement. That goal rests on boosting domestic production through new exploration, improved recovery from existing fields, and faster development timelines.

But some energy analysts caution that reversing the production decline will not be straightforward. Many of Egypt’s major gas fields are mature, and discoveries have been smaller and more complex. At the same time, investment decisions have been affected by payment arrears to international oil companies and broader fiscal constraints.

In the near term, LNG imports are likely to remain a fixture of Egypt’s energy mix, particularly during summer months. The deal with Qatar provides breathing room, but it also underscores how far Egypt has drifted from its earlier role as a net gas exporter.

Analysts believe that whether Cairo can stabilize production and regain that status will depend on sustained investment, regulatory clarity, and the pace of new discoveries. Agreements like this one with Qatar are usually less about expansion and more about damage control, ensuring that power generation and economic activity are not derailed by fuel shortages as demand continues to climb.

Ethiopia has edged closer to resolving one of Africa’s most closely watched sovereign debt crises after striking a preliminary agreement with a group of investors holding a significant portion of its $1 billion international bond that matured in 2024.

The deal, disclosed by the Finance Ministry on Friday, marks a critical milestone in the country’s prolonged effort to restructure its debt following its first-ever default late in 2023.

In a statement posted on the ministry’s official Facebook page, Ethiopian authorities said the parties had reached an “agreement in principle” covering the core financial terms of the bond restructuring. While the announcement signals meaningful progress, the government stressed that discussions are still ongoing over the non-financial terms of the new debt instrument that will replace the defaulted Eurobond.

These outstanding elements typically include legal provisions, governance clauses, and other structural features that can materially affect investor protections and the long-term viability of the reworked debt.

Coordination under the G20 Common Framework

The agreement has been communicated to both the International Monetary Fund and Ethiopia’s Official Creditor Committee (OCC), which represents bilateral lenders under the G20’s Common Framework for debt treatments. That step is crucial, as the framework requires comparable treatment across all creditor classes — bilateral lenders, multilateral institutions, and private bondholders — to prevent any group from receiving preferential terms.

“The terms of the Agreement in Principle have been communicated to the OCC for their non-objection as well as to the IMF to ensure compliance with Ethiopia’s long-term debt sustainability,” the ministry said.

An IMF spokesperson welcomed the development, describing it as an important advance in Ethiopia’s reform programme.

“This marks an important step toward restoring debt sustainability,” the spokesperson said in an emailed response. “We will assess the consistency of the agreement with the objectives and parameters of the IMF-supported program in the coming days.”

IMF approval is widely seen as a linchpin for Ethiopia’s broader recovery strategy, not only to unlock further disbursements under its Fund-supported programme but also to rebuild confidence among external investors and development partners.

According to the finance ministry, the Ad Hoc Committee involved in the talks consists of institutional investors controlling more than 45% of the outstanding 2024 Eurobond. Formal negotiations between the two sides took place between December 23 and January 1, following months of informal engagement that yielded limited progress.

Ethiopia said it aims to complete the restructuring process and implement the new bond instrument as early as possible in 2026. That timeline underscores both the complexity of the negotiations and the need to align private-sector concessions with agreements already reached with official creditors.

In July, the government finalized a restructuring deal with bilateral lenders, which it said would provide more than $3.5 billion in cashflow relief. That agreement was widely viewed as a necessary precursor to serious negotiations with bondholders, who have often been reluctant to commit without clarity on the scale of relief granted by governments and multilateral institutions.

Ethiopia defaulted on its sole international bond in late 2023 amid severe macroeconomic strains, including chronic foreign exchange shortages, high inflation, the economic fallout from internal conflict, and tighter global financial conditions. The default pushed the country into the G20 Common Framework, making it one of the highest-profile African economies to test a mechanism that has been criticized for slow timelines and procedural complexity.

Since then, progress has been uneven. While talks with bilateral creditors advanced more quickly, negotiations with private bondholders dragged on for months, highlighting persistent coordination challenges between different creditor groups.

What the preliminary deal signals

Although specific financial terms were not disclosed, restructurings under the Common Framework typically involve a combination of maturity extensions, reduced interest payments, and, in some cases, nominal haircuts on principal. The unresolved non-financial terms could cover issues such as governing law, dispute resolution mechanisms, and performance-linked features tied to Ethiopia’s economic recovery.

The agreement in principle offers investors the clearest indication yet that Ethiopia is moving toward a resolution, reducing uncertainty after a prolonged period of stalemate. For the government, it represents progress toward stabilizing public finances, restoring external credibility, and eventually regaining access to international capital markets.

Ethiopia’s restructuring is being closely watched by other low-income and frontier-market countries grappling with unsustainable debt burdens. A successful outcome would strengthen the case that the G20 Common Framework can deliver results, even if slowly, for countries with diverse creditor bases.

However, finalizing the deal will require securing sufficient bondholder participation, IMF sign-off, and continued implementation of domestic economic reforms. With growth pressures, social demands, and external financing needs still acute, Ethiopia’s debt challenge is far from over.

For now, however, the agreement in principle represents the most substantive step yet toward closing a chapter that has weighed heavily on the country’s economy since its 2023 default — and a tentative move toward financial normalization after years of strain.

Germany’s conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) has moved to formally back Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s proposal for a single European stock exchange, elevating the idea from a broad political ambition into a concrete strategic priority for Europe’s largest economy.

The party is positioning the plan as both an economic necessity for the European Union and a national interest for Germany, arguing that fragmented capital markets are steadily eroding Europe’s ability to finance growth, innovation, and globally competitive companies.

In a draft internal paper obtained by Reuters, the CSU said it would support efforts to strengthen European capital markets through the creation of a unified bourse, with the explicit goal of keeping successful German companies listed within Europe. The paper leaves little doubt about the party’s ambitions, stating that Germany should take a leadership role in the process and host the headquarters of any future European exchange.

“We support the strengthening of European capital markets and a European bourse in order to keep successful German companies in the country,” the document said. It added that the CSU intends to “ensure that the headquarters of a European bourse are located in the European Union’s biggest economy, Germany.”

The paper was circulated ahead of three-day party meetings beginning on Tuesday in Seeon, a Bavarian town that often serves as a setting for high-level CSU strategy discussions. The timing suggests the party wants the proposal firmly embedded in its broader economic agenda, as Merz seeks to define his chancellorship around competitiveness, investment, and Europe’s place in the global economy.

Merz first unveiled the idea in October, arguing that Europe’s capital markets are structurally too weak and too divided to support companies at scale. His argument taps into a long-running debate in Brussels, Frankfurt, and Paris about why Europe struggles to produce and retain global champions, particularly in technology and other capital-intensive sectors.

While Europe has a large pool of savings, policymakers have repeatedly warned that those funds are poorly channeled into productive investment because capital markets remain national, shallow, and complex.

Backing for deeper integration has grown steadily among senior officials. European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde has said that more unified capital markets are essential if Europe is to mobilize private investment, especially as public finances are under pressure and governments are expected to fund green and digital transitions. German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil and Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel have also spoken in favor of closer market integration, seeing it as a way to reduce Europe’s reliance on bank lending and to create a more resilient financial system.

Supporters of a single exchange point to the stark contrast with the United States. U.S. companies benefit from a dominant, highly liquid market centered on the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq, operating under a single regulatory framework. This concentration of capital attracts global investors and makes it easier for firms to raise large sums quickly.

In Europe, by comparison, listings are spread across multiple national exchanges, each governed by different rules, supervisory regimes, and market practices. That fragmentation, advocates say, dilutes liquidity, increases costs, and leaves European firms at a disadvantage when competing for global capital.

European exchange operators themselves have warned that this structure is hurting the continent’s ability to attract initial public offerings. Lower liquidity often translates into lower valuations, making European listings less appealing, particularly for fast-growing companies that need scale and visibility. The result has been a steady flow of European firms either postponing IPOs or choosing to list in the United States, a trend that has alarmed policymakers in Berlin, Paris, and Brussels.

For Germany, the issue carries added weight. As Europe’s largest economy, it has a strong interest in maintaining Frankfurt’s status as a major financial center and in keeping high-growth companies anchored in the region. The CSU’s insistence that Germany should host the headquarters of a European bourse signals concern that, without a decisive move, influence could drift toward other financial hubs or outside Europe altogether.

At the same time, the proposal faces significant political and practical challenges. National exchanges and regulators may be wary of losing authority, while smaller financial centers could fear marginalization. Creating a single bourse would require harmonizing listing standards, supervision, and market infrastructure across the EU, a process that would test political will and institutional coordination.

Even so, the CSU’s endorsement underlines a growing sense among Europe’s political leadership that incremental reforms may no longer be enough. With global capital increasingly gravitating toward large, unified markets, advocates of Merz’s plan argue that Europe must think and act on a similar scale. For them, a single European stock exchange is not just a financial reform, but a statement about Europe’s ambition to compete, invest, and grow on its own terms.