Michael Burry, the investor made famous by “The Big Short,” has delivered one of his most detailed and scathing critiques yet of the AI-driven stock market, arguing that headline earnings for many Nasdaq 100 companies are badly overstated because of the way they account for stock-based compensation.
In a lengthy Substack post published this week, Burry said he spent weeks poring over more than 1,000 annual reports from Nasdaq 100 constituents going back a decade. His conclusion: Wall Street and the companies themselves are presenting an “earnings illusion” that makes valuations look far more reasonable than they really are.
Burry’s central argument is straightforward but uncomfortable for bulls. Companies and analysts routinely fail to fully account for the true economic cost of stock-based compensation (SBC). They should include not only the reported expense but also the cash spent on share buybacks to offset dilution, plus the net taxes triggered when those shares vest for employees.
Under current GAAP accounting, he calculates that Nasdaq 100 earnings are overstated by nearly 20%. That means if the index appears to trade at a price-to-earnings ratio of 25, the more accurate multiple is closer to 30 once SBC is properly adjusted for.
“Of every dollar of earnings per share that GAAP blesses, shareholders see only 83.49 cents of that dollar,” Burry wrote. “The wayward 16.51 cents wave crudely at GAAP and thumb their noses at shareholders on their way to employees’ pockets.”
He went even further on forward estimates. Wall Street’s consensus projections, he says, are running 42% higher than what he calls “true owners’ earnings” after full SBC adjustments.
Over the ten years ending in fiscal 2025, the 97 primary Nasdaq 100 companies reported a cumulative $4.9 trillion in GAAP net income. Analysts, often adding back SBC, pegged that figure at $5.8 trillion. Burry’s adjusted “true owners’ earnings” came in at just $4.1 trillion.
The $1.7 trillion difference, he argues, represents pure illusion — “the difference between what shareholders really owned of corporate earnings and what Wall Street and media reported.”
“Wall Street over the last 10 years guided investors to 42% more earnings than ever actually existed,” he added.
Burry singled out Meta Platforms as a clear example. He estimates the company has overstated owners’ earnings by about 20%. While Meta may look like it trades at 19 times forward earnings on the surface, the real multiple rises to 24 once SBC is properly factored in. If shareholders ultimately receive only about 83% of reported income, that multiple stretches closer to 28.
He reserved especially sharp words for Tesla, noting that the electric vehicle maker’s heavy use of stock-based compensation is so large that removing it from his dataset drops the overall Nasdaq 100 overstatement from 20% to 12.5%. Burry also took aim at Tesla’s massive $1 trillion pay package for CEO Elon Musk, calling it “such a beastly mass [that] would dwarf everything in my data set, even Tesla’s own epic deadweight.”
Other names Burry called out for particularly aggressive SBC practices include Datadog, Workday, Axon, Shopify, Palantir, Marvell, CrowdStrike, and Zscaler. He described the group collectively as “from an owners’ earnings’ perspective, a cesspool of shareholder disregard.”
Burry’s critique lands at a moment when many high-flying tech stocks are trading at punchy valuations fueled by the AI boom. The Nasdaq has repeatedly hit record highs, and forward multiples for the Magnificent Seven and other AI leaders have expanded significantly. His analysis suggests investors may be paying even richer prices than they realize once the full cost of keeping talent happy with equity grants is stripped out.
The veteran investor, who built his reputation calling the housing bubble and has a long history of issuing cryptic but pointed warnings, has been vocal about overvaluation risks in tech for some time. This latest deep dive, backed by a decade of granular data, is his most systematic attack yet on what he sees as a systemic flaw in how corporate America and Wall Street measure profitability in the age of stock-heavy compensation.
In sum, Burry’s message is: beneath the glittering GAAP numbers and rosy analyst forecasts lies a quieter transfer of wealth from shareholders to employees that is far larger than most realize — and one that could make today’s seemingly elevated valuations look even more expensive in hindsight.
While it’s not clear whether his warning will prove prescient or simply become another voice of caution in a momentum-driven market, it has been loudly delivered like every other.






