European Union regulators are investigating OKX, one of the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchanges, following allegations that its OKX Web3 platform was used to launder approximately $100 million in stolen cryptocurrency from a $1.5 billion hack of the Bybit trading platform. The scrutiny centers on whether OKX’s Web3 services, marketed as a decentralized finance platform and self-custodial wallet, fall under the EU’s Markets in Cryptoassets (MiCA) regulations, which took full effect at the end of 2024. National watchdogs from the EU’s 27 member states discussed the issue during a confidential meeting hosted by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on March 6, 2025, focusing on OKX’s potential role in facilitating money laundering and its compliance with MiCA.

The investigation follows reports that Lazarus hackers, allegedly linked to North Korea, moved stolen funds—primarily Ether—through OKX’s Web3 platform, utilizing decentralized platforms and cross-chain bridges to obscure the trail. OKX has denied direct involvement in laundering, stating it took measures such as freezing related funds and blocking hacker addresses in real time to assist Bybit. The exchange also argues that its Web3 services, which aggregate access to various exchanges and blockchains, are comparable to those offered by other major crypto platforms and should not be subject to MiCA, as fully decentralized platforms are exempt.

However, regulators from countries like Austria and Croatia have argued that OKX’s Web3 platform is integrated into its centralized operations, with its user interface and terms of service clearly identifying an OKX Singapore entity as the operator, suggesting it falls within MiCA’s scope. The probe adds to OKX’s recent regulatory challenges. In February 2025, OKX pleaded guilty in the U.S. to operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business, agreeing to pay over $504 million in penalties for processing more than $1 trillion in transactions by U.S. customers without proper registration or anti-money laundering (AML) controls.

This history of non-compliance has heightened scrutiny in the EU, with Malta’s financial regulator, where OKX secured a MiCA pre-authorization in January 2025, now reviewing whether to revoke its permit. Regulators are also examining potential violations of sanctions against North Korea, given the alleged involvement of state-sponsored hackers. While the investigation highlights significant concerns about security and compliance in the crypto industry, it’s important to approach the narrative with skepticism.

The $100 million figure tied to OKX represents only a fraction of the $1.5 billion Bybit hack, and OKX’s claim of taking proactive measures—such as freezing funds and blocking addresses—suggests it may not have been complicit but rather a secondary platform exploited by hackers. The debate over whether OKX’s Web3 services fall under MiCA hinges on the blurry line between centralized and decentralized platforms, a regulatory gray area that has yet to be fully tested. Critics of the regulatory push might argue that such actions could stifle innovation in the decentralized finance (DeFi) space, where platforms often operate without traditional oversight by design.

Moreover, the focus on North Korean hackers aligns with a broader geopolitical narrative that may amplify the perceived severity of the incident. While North Korean cybercrime is a documented issue, attributing the hack to state actors without conclusive evidence risks sensationalizing the event for political or regulatory leverage. OKX’s past regulatory lapses, particularly in the U.S., provide context but do not necessarily prove intentional wrongdoing in this case.

Investors and users should remain cautious, recognizing that the outcome of this investigation could set a precedent for how DeFi platforms are regulated in the EU, potentially impacting the broader crypto ecosystem. However, the lack of public evidence and the confidential nature of the deliberations mean that conclusions about OKX’s culpability remain speculative at this stage.

Nigeria has signed a $200 million agreement with WeLight, a pan-African Distributed Renewable Energy (DRE) company, to deploy hundreds of renewable mini grids aimed at providing reliable electricity to millions of people in rural and peri-urban communities.

The deal represents a significant step in Nigeria’s growing embrace of renewable energy, which is increasingly seen as a viable alternative to the country’s struggling gas-powered electricity supply. With Nigeria’s national grid generating only around 5,000MW against an estimated demand of 30,000MW, energy poverty remains a critical challenge, especially in rural areas where grid supply is either unreliable or completely absent.

According to Reuters, the project, backed by the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB), will focus on setting up 400 mini-grids and 50 MetroGrids across rural Nigeria, improving electricity access for an estimated 1.5 to 2 million people.

For decades, Nigeria’s electricity crisis has remained one of the biggest obstacles to economic growth. Despite being one of Africa’s largest economies, Nigeria has one of the lowest electricity access rates on the continent, with millions relying on costly and polluting diesel generators due to frequent blackouts and inadequate supply from the national grid. Mini-grids powered by renewable energy sources like solar and wind have been identified as a key solution to Nigeria’s energy gap, particularly in rural areas that are too far from the national grid or underserved due to weak transmission infrastructure.

The deal with WeLight is expected to help bridge this gap, as mini-grids offer localized power generation that can provide stable and affordable electricity to homes, businesses, and essential services like healthcare and education. The Nigerian government has been actively working to increase the share of renewable energy in its electricity mix from 22% to 50% in line with its National Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Policy (NREEEP). This has led to a shift towards private-sector partnerships, with the government seeking investments to develop solar, wind, and hydropower projects to complement its traditional fossil-fuel-based electricity supply.

WeLight, backed by Axian Group, Sagemcom, and Norfund, announced that it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Rural Electrification Agency (REA) on Monday. Romain de Villeneuve, Chief Executive Officer of WeLight, said in a statement that the agreement represents a leap toward providing clean electricity to millions in Nigeria while also supporting WeLight’s ambition to become a truly pan-African company.

The company has already established a presence in Madagascar, Mali, and Niger, where it has built solar-powered mini-grids to electrify off-grid communities. Its expansion into Nigeria is seen as a major milestone in its bid to become a dominant player in Africa’s renewable energy space.

Beyond improving energy access, the project is expected to stimulate economic growth in rural areas, where a lack of reliable electricity has severely limited productivity and industrial development. Many small businesses in rural areas operate below capacity due to power shortages, while farmers often lose perishable goods due to the lack of cold storage and processing facilities.

Nigeria’s current electricity generation capacity remains grossly insufficient, with the national grid barely generating 5,000MW—far below the estimated 30,000MW required to meet national demand. As a result, many parts of the country experience daily power outages, while some rural areas have never had grid electricity at all. The country’s over-reliance on gas-powered electricity has contributed to this crisis, as inconsistent gas supply, vandalism of pipelines, and aging infrastructure continue to disrupt power generation.

Renewable energy solutions like solar mini-grids provide a cheaper, faster, and more sustainable way to increase electricity supply, particularly for off-grid communities. Unlike fossil fuel-based power plants, which require large investments in infrastructure and fuel supply, mini-grids can be deployed quickly and operated at lower costs.

X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter, experienced multiple global outages, affecting users in countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Australia, Nigeria and Canada. These disruptions, which occurred in at least three distinct waves, began around 5:30 a.m. ET on 10th March and continued intermittently throughout the day, with peak reports of issues reaching over 41,000 according to outage tracking site Downdetector. Users reported problems such as inability to load the app or website, refresh timelines, post content, or log in, with the majority of issues affecting the mobile app (around 58% of complaints) and the website (32%).

Elon Musk, the owner of X, attributed the outages to a “massive cyberattack,” specifically claiming it was a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, which overwhelms servers with traffic to disrupt service. He suggested the attack required significant resources, potentially involving a “large, coordinated group and/or a country,” and in a Fox Business interview, he claimed that the IP addresses involved originated in the “Ukraine area.”

However, cybersecurity experts have expressed skepticism about these claims, noting that tracing IP addresses in DDoS attacks is unreliable due to the use of compromised devices worldwide, which can mask the true origin. Additionally, a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group called DarkStorm claimed responsibility for the attack via a Telegram post, stating it was a DDoS attack aimed at disrupting X’s services, though this claim has not been independently verified.

The outages were significant, with some lasting up to several hours, marking one of the longest disruptions in X’s recent history. While the platform experienced partial restoration of services in some regions, the repeated nature of the outages raised questions about the platform’s stability, especially following significant staff reductions and infrastructure changes since Musk’s acquisition of the company in October 2022.

Critics have pointed to these changes, including the layoffs of around 80% of the original staff, as potential factors weakening the platform’s resilience to such incidents. However, without official confirmation of the attack’s cause or perpetrators, the exact reason for the outages remains uncertain, and the narrative of a state-sponsored attack, particularly from Ukraine, has been met with caution by experts due to lack of concrete evidence.

In addition to Dark Storm, the pro-Palestinian hacktivist group that claimed responsibility for the March 10, 2025, cyberattacks on X, numerous other hacktivist groups have been active globally, often driven by ideological, political, nationalistic, or opportunistic motives. Below is an overview of some notable hacktivist groups, their motivations, and their typical targets, providing context to the broader landscape of hacktivism.

One of the most well-known hacktivist collectives is Anonymous, a decentralized, non-hierarchical movement that emerged in the early 2000s. Anonymous is recognized for its advocacy of free speech, government transparency, internet freedom, and social justice, often targeting entities perceived as corrupt or oppressive, such as governments, corporations, religious organizations, and extremist groups.

Their operations, including high-profile campaigns like Project Chanology against the Church of Scientology and cyberattacks on Russian targets following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have made them a prominent symbol of hacktivism. Anonymous often employs tactics like DDoS attacks, data leaks, and website defacements, though some within the movement, like former member Oxblood Ruffin, have criticized the use of DDoS attacks as contrary to free speech principles.

Another significant group is RedHack, a Turkish Marxist-Leninist hacktivist collective founded in 1997. RedHack focuses on promoting social and political change in Turkey and beyond, targeting government agencies, political parties, and corporations to support causes such as workers’ rights and opposition to internet censorship. Their actions, such as releasing sensitive government documents and defacing websites, have led to conflicts with the Turkish government, resulting in arrests and prosecutions of several members, though the group remains active.

GhostSec, a spinoff of Anonymous that emerged in 2015, is known for its efforts to combat online extremism and terrorism, particularly targeting the online propaganda and recruitment efforts of groups like ISIS. GhostSec monitors social media platforms, identifies extremist content, and takes down associated websites and accounts. While praised for disrupting terrorist activities, their vigilante tactics have raised ethical and legal concerns, particularly around censorship and accountability.

AntiSec, formed in 2011 as a collaboration between Anonymous and LulzSec, aims to expose and disrupt systems of government and corporate power perceived as unjust or oppressive. Their tactics include website defacements, data breaches, and DDoS attacks, often targeting high-profile organizations to highlight vulnerabilities and challenge authority. AntiSec’s activities underscore the overlap between hacktivism and cybercrime, as their methods, while ideologically driven, often involve illegal actions.

The IT Army of Ukraine, formed in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, is a volunteer cyberwarfare organization focused on protecting Ukraine from Russian cyberattacks and launching counteroperations against Russian targets. This group exemplifies nationalistic hacktivism, leveraging technical expertise to support state interests during geopolitical conflicts, often targeting Russian government and infrastructure websites.

Other notable groups include Killnet, a pro-Russian hacktivist collective known for attacking government institutions in countries opposing Russian interests, and NoName057(16), a pro-Russian group that has been highly active in DDoS attacks, particularly against nations supporting Ukraine, such as Israel, India, and Poland.

Anonymous Sudan, despite its name, is a religiously motivated group rather than a politically aligned one, often targeting entities perceived as anti-Muslim, though some speculate ties to Russian interests due to attack patterns. These groups illustrate the diverse motivations within hacktivism, ranging from ideological and political agendas to nationalistic and opportunistic goals.

While some, like Anonymous, frame their actions as digital civil disobedience, others, such as Killnet or NoName057(16), align closely with state interests, blurring the line between hacktivism and state-sponsored cyber operations. The tactics used—DDoS attacks, data leaks, website defacements, and doxing—are consistent across groups, but their targets and justifications vary widely, reflecting the complex and often contentious nature of hacktivism in the digital age.