Before Amazon became a household name in America, it needed a push. And that push came quietly, through policy. For years, the U.S. government allowed online retailers not to collect sales tax. That single exemption tilted the market. Buying online suddenly made sense.

Back then, students would walk into bookstores, flip through recommended texts, note the editions, and then go home to order from Amazon, saving roughly 10% in tax. As shopping carts expanded on total value, so did the savings. On a $1,000 item with a 10% sales tax, that was $100 kept in your pocket. And with Amazon often offering free delivery, even if it took days, the value proposition was clear.

Americans got the message. They moved online. Foot traffic in physical stores thinned. And one after another, retail giants fell, from Circuit City to J.C. Penney and many in between. Amazon did not just win because of technology; it won because policy created space for it to scale.

At the same time, Tesla was building electric cars that were far too expensive for most people. Again, policy stepped in. The U.S. government and many states introduced tax credits and deductions that allowed buyers to subtract part of the cost of those cars when filing taxes. Suddenly, a Tesla became more affordable. Without those assists, the Tesla we celebrate today might never have taken its current shape.

Yes, that is not pure, textbook capitalism. But governments are not blind. When they see new markets forming, they lean in.

China does the same, only more visibly. While the U.S. nudges through incentives and exemptions, China often builds and invests in plain sight. Today, we read of a $21 billion, state-backed venture initiative: three massive funds aimed at “hard technology”, the kind of deep, foundational innovations that shape long-term competitiveness and national security. These funds will target early-stage startups, spreading capital across hundreds of young firms rather than concentrating on a few late-stage champions. It is ecosystem thinking, at scale.

Good People, every system can work provided three things are present: merit, honesty, and pragmatism. The American system works. The Chinese system works. The Russian system works. And the African system can also work, if we allow those three attributes to lead.

In ancestral Africa, communities built together. They pooled labor, shared risk, and raised institutions collectively. That system sustained societies for generations. It was not broken.

So, the real question is not whether to copy America or imitate China. The real task is to strengthen merit, insist on honesty, and act with pragmatism. When those are in place, most development frameworks will deliver. And that means our leaders must not depend on World Bank or IMF for new lectures before they can fix our lands because most systems, anchored on those three attributes, will work!

China Launches $21 Billion Venture Capital Push to Accelerate ‘Hard Tech’ Self-Reliance

China has taken another decisive step to deepen its push for technological self-reliance, launching three massive state-backed venture capital funds aimed squarely at “hard technology” sectors seen as critical to long-term economic and national security goals.

State broadcaster CCTV reported on Friday that the capital contribution plans for the funds have been finalized, with each fund sized at more than 50 billion yuan ($7.14 billion), bringing the combined war chest to over 150 billion yuan ($21 billion). The scale alone makes the initiative one of the largest coordinated public venture capital efforts China has rolled out in recent years.

According to an official cited in the report, the funds will focus on early-stage startups, particularly companies valued at less than 500 million yuan. Individual investments will be capped at 50 million yuan, a structure designed to spread capital across a wide pool of firms and nurture an ecosystem of emerging technologies rather than concentrating funding in a few late-stage champions.

The targeted sectors point to Beijing’s self-reliance priorities. Investment will flow into integrated circuits and semiconductor manufacturing, quantum technologies, biomedicine, brain–computer interface development, aerospace, and other advanced industrial and scientific fields. These areas are widely viewed by Chinese policymakers as bottlenecks where the country remains vulnerable to external pressure. By contrast, so-called “soft” technologies such as consumer internet platforms and online services are excluded, reflecting a deliberate pivot away from the platform-driven growth model that dominated the previous decade.

The launch comes against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical and technological friction, particularly with the United States. Export controls on advanced chips, chipmaking equipment, and related technologies have sharpened Beijing’s resolve to build domestic alternatives and reduce reliance on foreign suppliers. Hard technology, in this context, is seen not just as an economic growth engine but as a strategic necessity.

Beyond geopolitics, the funds also address structural weaknesses in China’s venture capital market. Deep-tech startups typically face long development timelines, heavy capital requirements, and uncertain commercial outcomes. In recent years, private venture capital has increasingly favored quicker returns, leaving many hard-tech firms underfunded or overly dependent on government subsidies. By injecting large pools of patient capital, authorities aim to stabilize funding conditions, support sustained research and development, and help promising firms survive the so-called “valley of death” between laboratory breakthroughs and commercial viability.

The emphasis on early-stage investment suggests policymakers want to influence innovation at its roots, shaping technology trajectories before companies become large or strategically constrained. Officials have previously said similar state-backed funds would be run on more market-oriented principles, balancing commercial discipline with national strategic objectives, though details on governance, fund managers, and expected investment horizons have not yet been disclosed.

The initiative also fits into a broader recalibration of China’s economic model. As the property sector downturn weighs on growth and traditional investment engines lose momentum, Beijing has repeatedly framed advanced manufacturing and frontier technologies as the foundation of “high-quality development.” Large-scale funds such as these are intended to crowd in private capital, signal long-term policy commitment, and anchor innovation-led growth.

While questions remain about execution, returns, and the risk of misallocation, analysts say the sheer size and focus of the funds send a clear message: China is doubling down on hard technology as a central pillar of its future economy. If effectively deployed, the capital could accelerate breakthroughs in core technologies, especially semiconductor, reshape the country’s startup landscape, and deepen the state’s role as a long-term venture investor in strategically vital industries.

Nigeria experienced an 11.78% decline in remittance inflows through International Money Transfer Operators in the first half of 2025, with total receipts falling to $2.07 billion from $2.34 billion in the same period of 2024—a shortfall of $275.93 million.

The figures, drawn from the Central Bank of Nigeria’s latest Quarterly Statistical Bulletin released on December 24, highlight persistent challenges in channeling diaspora funds through formal channels, even as remittances remain a vital lifeline for household consumption and foreign exchange liquidity.

The drop comes despite aggressive CBN reforms aimed at boosting inflows, including removing exchange rate caps for IMTOs in January 2024, revising operational guidelines to enhance competition, and establishing a Collaborative Task Force—reporting directly to Governor Olayemi Cardoso—to double remittance volumes. These measures had propelled a 44.5% surge to $4.76 billion in full-year 2024 inflows, but momentum has not carried into 2025.

Quarterly and Monthly Breakdown: Q1 2025 (Jan-Mar): $888.39 million, down 17.9% ($193.14 million) from $1.08 billion in Q1 2024—the sharpest quarterly fall.

• January: $281.97 million (-27.8% from $390.86 million).
• February: $288.82 million (-11.6% from $326.91 million).
• March: $317.60 million (-12.7% from $363.76 million).
• Q2 2025 (Apr-Jun): $1.18 billion, down a milder 6.6% from $1.26 billion in Q2 2024, cushioned by an April spike.
• April: $597.44 million (+28.2% from $466.11 million)—the only month with growth.
• May: $288.17 million (-28.8% from $404.75 million).
• June: $292.25 million (-25.0% from $389.79 million).

The April surge softened the overall half-year decline but proved anomalous, with inflows weakening again in May and June amid seasonal and economic factors.

Diaspora remittances rank as Nigeria’s second-largest foreign exchange source after oil exports, contributing roughly 5-6% to GDP and supporting millions of households amid inflation averaging 30%+ in 2025.

Formal IMTO channels (Western Union, MoneyGram, Ria, etc.) captured the bulk, but informal transfers—via hand-carried cash or unregistered networks—likely offset some decline, though harder to quantify. The World Bank estimates total remittances (formal and informal) at $20-25 billion annually, underscoring their role in poverty alleviation and economic stability.

Reasons for the Decline

Industry stakeholders attribute the slowdown to a mix of domestic and global headwinds, such as inflationary pressures in advanced economies, such as the US, UK, EU, tighter labor markets, tougher migration policies, and potential shifts to informal channels due to naira volatility.

The World Bank notes that while global remittances to low- and middle-income countries grew 1.5% to $690 billion in 2025, Sub-Saharan Africa saw subdued flows due to economic slowdowns in host nations.

Broader Implications

As Nigeria’s external reserves hover around $40-46 billion, weaker remittances pressure the balance of payments at a time of high debt service of $2.32 billion, as of H1 2025, and import dependence.

A 10% increase in remittances correlates with 2% GDP growth (World Bank estimates), fueling sectors like fintech, e-commerce, and edtech.

While Nigeria’s H1 formal inflows declined, full-year projections remain optimistic at $23 billion—up from $19.5 billion in 2023 and representing 35% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s total, driven by diaspora engagement and digital platforms.

Globally, remittances to low- and middle-income countries grew 1.5% to $690 billion in 2025. Africa saw inflows surge to $95 billion in 2024.

Latin America bucked the trend with 10.9% growth in Q1 2025, highlighting Nigeria’s underperformance relative to peers.

China has unveiled a far-reaching overhaul of the rules governing funds raised by domestic companies through overseas listings, signaling a renewed push by Beijing to tighten supervision of cross-border capital flows while still keeping global fundraising channels open.

Under the new guidelines jointly issued on Friday by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), companies will be required, “in principle,” to repatriate proceeds raised from offshore share sales back to the mainland. The rules, which take effect on April 1, 2026, are part of a broader effort to reduce financial risks, improve transparency, and strengthen control over the capital account at a time of heightened global market volatility.

The regulators said that if companies intend to keep funds overseas for purposes such as foreign direct investment, overseas securities investment, or the provision of overseas loans, they must secure approval before the listing is completed. This pre-approval requirement closes a long-standing grey area that allowed some firms to retain large pools of offshore capital with limited oversight after listing abroad.

To further tighten supervision, the rules mandate the use of dedicated capital accounts for all cross-border fund settlements related to overseas listings. Proceeds generated through shareholder transactions, including the buying or selling of overseas-listed shares, are also expected to be repatriated in principle. Regulators view these measures as essential to improving the traceability of funds and preventing misuse, speculative flows, or hidden capital flight.

At the same time, the guidelines include targeted flexibilities aimed at avoiding unnecessary disruption to corporate finance activities. Companies will be permitted to use either offshore or onshore funds to buy back their own overseas-listed shares, giving them room to manage valuations, investor expectations, and capital structures in volatile markets.

The rules also clarify treatment under the H-share “full circulation” regime, which allows all shares of a mainland-incorporated company to become tradable in Hong Kong. Under the new framework, fund transfers linked to full circulation must go through ChinaClear’s designated accounts, strengthening oversight of settlement flows. Dividends paid to mainland shareholders must be settled in renminbi within China rather than through offshore channels, reinforcing Beijing’s preference for keeping RMB flows onshore and under regulatory supervision.

While oversight is being tightened, authorities moved to ease administrative frictions. Registration deadlines related to overseas listings have been extended to 30 days from 15 days, a change intended to reduce compliance pressure and improve predictability for companies planning offshore IPOs or secondary listings. The PBOC and SAFE said they would continue refining cross-border capital management rules to strike a balance between risk control and convenience.

The new framework reflects Beijing’s evolving approach to financial openness. After years of encouraging overseas listings to help companies tap global capital, regulators have become more cautious as geopolitical tensions, U.S. scrutiny of Chinese firms, currency pressures, and episodes of capital outflow have raised concerns about financial stability. Chinese authorities now aim to ensure that offshore fundraising ultimately supports domestic economic activity rather than remaining outside the regulatory perimeter, by formalizing repatriation expectations and strengthening account-level supervision.

Market participants say the rules are unlikely to halt overseas listings outright, but they could influence how companies structure deals and manage post-listing capital. Firms with significant overseas expansion plans may face longer lead times and closer scrutiny, while those seeking to retain funds offshore will need clearer justifications aligned with policy objectives.

Overall, the measures underline Beijing’s message that international capital markets remain accessible, but on terms that prioritize macro-financial stability, regulatory visibility, and tighter control over cross-border funding flows.