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Recapitalized but Not Rewired: CPPE Warns Nigeria’s Banks Still Missing the Real Economy

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Nigeria’s banking sector has emerged from a sweeping recapitalization drive with stronger buffers and renewed investor interest, but a growing body of evidence suggests the core problem, how credit flows through the economy, remains largely unresolved.

In a pointed policy brief released Sunday, the Centre for the Promotion of Private Enterprise argued that the country’s financial system continues to favor liquidity over productivity, with lending patterns that do little to support industrial growth or job creation.

Signed by its chief executive, Muda Yusuf, the report commended the Central Bank of Nigeria for executing a smooth recapitalization programme. But it cautioned that stronger capital positions, on their own, do not guarantee a more effective banking system.

“Credit with maturity of less than one year accounts for about 55% of total credit, while long-term credit (above three years) accounts for only about 25%,” the CPPE noted. “This structure is not aligned with the financing needs of critical sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure and real estate.”

That mismatch goes to the heart of Nigeria’s development challenge. Long-term capital is essential for building factories, expanding farms, financing housing, and developing infrastructure. Yet the dominance of short-tenor lending means banks are effectively financing working capital and trading activity rather than fixed investment.

The scale of the problem is reflected in aggregate figures. Private sector credit stood at just 17% of GDP in 2025, far below the sub-Saharan African average of 25% and well under the 34% typical of lower-middle-income economies. For a country of Nigeria’s size and ambition, economists say that the gap translates into a significant constraint on growth.

Sectoral allocation reinforces the concern as services account for roughly 55% of total bank lending, while manufacturing receives only 14% and agriculture about 5%. The pattern mirrors the structure of returns in the economy: commerce and financial services offer quicker turnover and lower default risk, while production sectors require patience, scale, and tolerance for volatility.

Small businesses, widely regarded as the backbone of the economy, remain largely excluded. SMEs account for about half of GDP and more than 80% of employment, yet receive barely 1% of total bank credit. In comparable African markets, that figure is closer to 5%.

Consumer credit, often a driver of domestic demand in more mature economies, is also underdeveloped at just 7% of total lending, compared with a regional range of 15% to 25%. The implication is a credit system that is neither fueling production nor significantly supporting consumption at scale.

Behind these patterns lies a set of entrenched structural distortions.

Government borrowing remains a dominant force in the domestic financial market, offering banks relatively high returns with minimal risk. This has created a persistent crowding-out effect, where private sector borrowers struggle to compete for funds.

At the same time, tight monetary policy and elevated interest rates have raised the cost of credit to levels that many businesses, particularly in manufacturing and agriculture, cannot absorb. Even when funds are available, the pricing often makes long-term projects unviable.

Risk perception is another barrier. Banks continue to impose stringent collateral requirements, effectively excluding a large segment of SMEs that lack formal assets despite viable business models. Weak credit infrastructure, including limited credit history data and enforcement challenges, further compounds the problem.

There is also a question of incentives. The current framework rewards short-term lending and trading activities, reinforcing a cycle in which capital circulates within low-risk segments rather than being deployed into transformative investments.

These dynamics persist even as headline indicators point to progress. The CBN governor, Olayemi Cardoso, recently disclosed that 32 banks have met revised minimum capital requirements under the recapitalization programme. Lenders have collectively raised about N4.61 trillion in fresh capital, indicating strong investor appetite and growing foreign participation.

Regulators say the exercise is already strengthening confidence in the sector and enabling Nigerian banks to expand regionally. But CPPE’s analysis suggests that resilience and reach are not the same as effectiveness.

The real test, the think tank argues, is whether banks can intermediate more efficiently—mobilizing savings and directing them into sectors that generate output, employment, and export capacity.

That shift will likely require more than capital. Analysts point to the need for complementary reforms: reducing the government’s domestic borrowing footprint, easing monetary conditions as inflation stabilizes, strengthening credit guarantee schemes, and improving the legal and institutional framework for lending.

There is also a broader strategic question. Nigeria’s push for economic diversification, away from oil and toward manufacturing and agriculture, depends heavily on access to affordable, long-term finance. Without it, industrial policy risks being undermined by a financial system that is structurally misaligned with national priorities.

The picture is currently one of contradiction. Banks are stronger, better capitalized, and more liquid than they have been in years. Yet the flow of credit remains narrow, short-term, and concentrated in sectors that do not drive structural transformation.

Besides CPPE, financial analysts believe that until that changes, the benefits of recapitalization may remain largely confined to balance sheets, rather than the broader economy policymakers are seeking to rebuild.

UK Consumer Confidence in March Hits Weakest Level in Nearly a Year 

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Recent data confirms a notable drop in UK consumer confidence in March 2026, hitting its weakest level in nearly a year according to the long-running GfK Consumer Confidence Index. The headline index fell to -21 from -19 in February, driven largely by a sharp deterioration in views of the general economic outlook over the next 12 months down 6 points to -37.

The primary trigger appears to be escalating conflict in the Middle East particularly involving Iran, which has raised fears of higher energy prices, renewed inflation pressures, and slower growth. Households are bracing for knock-on effects like increased fuel and utility costs, with analysts noting a ripple of fear spreading through sentiment.

Complementary data from the British Retail Consortium (BRC)-Opinium survey paints an even gloomier picture: Expectations for the economy over the next three months plunged to -53 from -30 in February. Personal finance prospects fell to -17 from -6. Both readings mark the lowest since the BRC series began in 2024, described as the weakest in at least two years in some metrics.

This shift has translated into more defensive consumer behavior: a rise in the savings index and reduced willingness to make major purchases, even as personal finances views held relatively steady in the GfK data.

The UK economy was already facing headwinds entering 2026, including a cooling labour market, subdued spending growth, and earlier forecasts of modest GDP expansion around 1.0–1.1% for the year down from stronger 2025 expectations in some projections. Consumer spending has remained cautious despite prior real income gains, with households prioritizing essentials and saving more than pre-pandemic norms.

Retail sales showed softness even before the latest geopolitical spike, and higher energy costs could exacerbate cost-of-living pressures, potentially feeding into inflation and forcing tighter belts. The OECD has flagged the UK as facing one of the larger growth impacts among major economies from Middle East disruptions.

That said, this is a sentiment shock rather than a confirmed collapse in hard data yet. Official GDP, employment, and spending figures for Q1 2026 will provide a clearer test in coming months. The Bank of England and government will be watching closely for any spillover into actual consumption, which accounts for a large share of UK economic activity.

Weaker confidence often precedes slower retail, hospitality, and discretionary spending, which could weigh on growth and retailers. Surging oil and energy prices could complicate the disinflation path, though global factors might moderate some effects. Calls for measures like fuel duty relief or broader cost-of-living support may intensify, especially with pump prices rising.

The UK faces a genuine stress test from this combination of geopolitical uncertainty and pre-existing caution. Resilience will depend on how quickly tensions ease, whether inflation expectations remain anchored, and the underlying strength of the labour market and real incomes.

Economies have navigated similar sentiment dips before, but prolonged energy shocks could turn this into a more material drag on 2026 growth.

The Middle East conflict—specifically the escalation involving US and Israeli strikes on Iran that began in late February 2026, followed by Iranian retaliation and a de facto disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—has triggered a significant energy price shock with broad ripple effects on the UK economy.

The Strait of Hormuz normally carries about 20% of global seaborne oil and a substantial share of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Disruptions from attacks on energy infrastructure, threats to tankers, and insurance issues have sharply curtailed exports from the Gulf. This has driven: Brent crude oil prices up dramatically.

UK petrol prices rising noticeably: average petrol up ~17p/litre to around 150p and diesel even more since the conflict started. Every $10 rise in oil typically adds ~7p to pump prices. Wholesale gas prices surging; up over 90% in some reports, feeding through to higher electricity costs and forecasts of household energy bills rising by £300–£500+ annually from summer 2026.

The UK, as a net energy importer reliant on global markets, feels this acutely despite domestic North Sea production.

President Trump Publicly Criticizes German Chancellor Over Germany’s Reluctance on Iran

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US President Donald Trump has publicly criticized German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over Germany’s reluctance to treat the ongoing US-Israel conflict with Iran as a shared priority, particularly regarding security in the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump made the remarks recently while speaking at a conference in Miami, Florida, and in other comments. He referenced Merz saying the Iran war is not our war and not NATO’s war. Trump responded by drawing a parallel to Ukraine: Well, Ukraine’s not our war. We helped, but Ukraine’s not our war. He called the German statement inappropriate and highlighted frustration with limited allied support for securing key shipping routes amid the conflict.

Chancellor Merz has stated that Germany is not part of the war and does not want to become involved militarily. He has expressed doubts about the effectiveness of US and Israeli military actions, saying he’s not convinced they will lead to success and noting that the US and Israel are becoming more deeply entangled daily.

Merz has offered potential post-ceasefire cooperation but emphasized this is not a NATO matter. He reportedly told Trump in a call that he understands this stance, and Germany initially showed some alignment on goals like countering Iran’s regime but has grown more critical over strategy, lack of consultation, and escalation risks.

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier went further, calling the Iran war a “disastrous mistake” and a breach of international law, warning of a profound rupture in transatlantic ties. Merz has been more measured, avoiding strong legal condemnations while pushing for an early end to hostilities due to economic and security concerns for Europe.

This stems from US and Israeli military actions against Iran reportedly involving strikes, with concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, regional stability, and disruptions to global energy shipping via the Strait of Hormuz. European allies, including Germany, have been reluctant to commit forces, leading to Trump’s irritation with NATO partners.

Earlier, Merz met Trump at the White House and expressed shared goals against Iran’s regime while hoping for a quick resolution.
Trump’s framingTrump has used the exchange to underscore his “America First” approach: if allies won’t fully back US efforts in the Middle East, the US may reconsider its level of involvement elsewhere.

This fits his pattern of pressing NATO members on burden-sharing. The exchange highlights ongoing transatlantic friction during Trump’s second term, with Germany balancing support for Israel/US goals against domestic caution, economic risks, and preference for diplomacy/ceasefires. Merz has faced criticism at home for his handling—some see it as too deferential to the US initially, others as insufficiently firm.

This remains a developing story amid the broader Iran conflict, with both sides signaling interest in de-escalation while disagreeing on roles and timelines. The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most critical oil transit chokepoint. It handles the vast majority of energy exports from the Persian Gulf region, home to some of the planet’s largest oil and gas reserves.

In recent years roughly 20–21 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products have flowed through the strait. This equates to: About 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption.
Roughly 25% or up to 27% of total global seaborne oil trade.

Rje Strait of Hormuz also carries significant liquefied natural gas (LNG), primarily from Qatar around 19–20% of global LNG trade. Additional traffic includes refined products, petrochemicals, and container ships. On a normal day, around 100 cargo vessels (60–70% of them oil/gas tankers) transit the strait.

About 80–84% of the oil heading through the strait goes to Asian markets especially China, India, Japan, South Korea, making Asia particularly exposed. The U.S. imports a smaller share directly around 400,000 b/d pre-conflict, or ~7% of its crude imports.

Foreign Outflows Persist on NGX Despite Pickup in Inflows, Underscoring Fragile Investor Confidence

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Foreign investor activity on the Nigerian Exchange Limited showed signs of life in February, but the underlying signal remains one of caution, with capital exits still exceeding inflows despite a notable rebound in participation.

The latest Domestic and Foreign Portfolio Investment Report shows foreign inflows rose sharply by 39.39% to N66.71 billion, suggesting a tentative return of offshore interest after a weak start to the year. Yet that optimism was tempered by a continued rise in outflows, which climbed 9.12% to N72.32 billion, leaving a net outflow of N5.61 billion.

While narrower than January’s N18.42 billion net exit, the February figure extends a pattern that has defined Nigeria’s equities market in recent years: foreign investors are willing to trade, but remain reluctant to stay.

The dual increase in inflows and outflows points to a market driven more by short-term positioning than long-term conviction. Analysts say part of the inflow rebound likely reflects bargain hunting as equity prices adjust, alongside tactical allocations aimed at capturing yield in a high-interest-rate environment. However, the persistence of outflows indicates that many investors continue to take profits quickly or reduce exposure at the first sign of volatility.

In absolute terms, foreign participation is rising, with total transactions increasing 21.81% to N139.03 billion. But in relative terms, its footprint is shrinking. Foreign investors accounted for just 9.01% of total market activity in February, down from 13.24% in January — a reminder that the market’s recent surge has been overwhelmingly domestic in origin.

Total turnover on the exchange jumped 78.93% to N1.542 trillion, driven almost entirely by local investors. Institutional players led with N854.83 billion, while retail participation stood at N548.50 billion. Combined, domestic investors accounted for more than 90% of all transactions, reinforcing their role as the market’s primary source of liquidity.

This dominance has become structural. Over time, Nigeria’s equities market has evolved into one largely sustained by local capital, partly due to recurring bouts of foreign investor retreat triggered by currency instability, inflation, and policy uncertainty. While this has insulated the market from abrupt external shocks, it has also limited the depth and diversity of capital flows.

The year-to-date numbers reinforce that trend. Foreign inflows totaled N114.57 billion in the first two months of 2026, compared with outflows of N138.60 billion, resulting in a net exit of N24.03 billion. Foreign participation accounted for just 10.53% of overall transactions, dwarfed by domestic activity at 89.47%.

Behind these figures lies a familiar set of concerns. Currency risk remains at the forefront. For foreign investors, returns in naira terms can be quickly eroded by exchange rate depreciation, making the timing of entry and exit critical. Questions around liquidity in the foreign exchange market and the ease of repatriating funds continue to weigh on sentiment.

At the same time, elevated inflation and tight monetary conditions complicate the outlook. While higher interest rates can attract yield-seeking capital, they also signal underlying economic stress and can dampen corporate earnings, limiting the appeal of equities.

From the analysts’ perspective, February’s data suggests that some investors are willing to test the waters, but not yet commit fully. The improvement in inflows points to selective confidence, possibly tied to specific sectors or undervalued stocks. However, the continued rise in outflows indicates that broader concerns about macroeconomic stability remain unresolved.

The sharp increase in total market turnover adds another layer to the picture. It is seen as a reflection of strong domestic engagement, but also hints at increased trading activity rather than sustained investment—a dynamic that can amplify volatility if sentiment shifts.

For the market to attract durable foreign capital, analysts say a clearer policy framework will be essential, particularly around exchange rate management and inflation control. Stability in these areas would reduce the risk premium currently attached to Nigerian assets and encourage longer-term allocations.

However, foreign investors appear content to engage opportunistically rather than strategically — stepping in when valuations are compelling, but stepping out just as quickly when risks resurface. Currently, the Nigerian market is thriving on the strength of domestic participation, even as it waits for a more decisive return of foreign capital.

Bitcoin Mining Hashprice Has Fallen to Some of the Lowest Levels in Recent Years

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Bitcoin mining’s hashprice—the expected daily revenue per unit of computing power typically measured in USD per petahash per second per day, or $/PH/s/day—has fallen to some of the lowest levels in recent years, with multiple reports highlighting new lows or near-record lows in early-to-mid 2026.

Hashprice measures how much revenue from block rewards plus transaction fees a miner can expect from 1 PH/s (petahash per second) of hashrate per day. It directly reflects mining profitability and is influenced by: Bitcoin’s price Network hashrate (total computing power). Mining difficulty (which adjusts roughly every two weeks to keep blocks ~10 minutes apart).

When Bitcoin’s price drops or hashrate, difficulty rises sharply, hashprice compresses, squeezing margins. In February 2026, hashprice hit all-time or post-halving lows around $0.03 per TH/s/day; equivalent to roughly $28–$32 per PH/s/day in various reports, amid a Bitcoin price decline from highs near $95,000–$126,000 toward the $60,000–$70,000 range.

This marked a roughly 35% drop year-over-year in some metrics and followed the 2024 halving’s long-term impact on rewards. As of late March 2026, current hashprice hovers around $31–$33 per PH/s/day, still near historic lows and pressuring less efficient operations.

 Network hashrate has fluctuated, recently dipping below 1 ZH/s (zetahash per second, or 1,000 EH/s) at times—down from peaks over 1.1–1.2 ZH/s in 2025—partly due to miners powering down unprofitable rigs. Difficulty has also seen notable drops (e.g., second-largest of 2026 recently), providing some relief by reducing competition.

Bitcoin price volatility: Sharp corrections directly lower revenue per hash. High hashrate and difficulty: More efficient machines and network growth increase competition, spreading rewards thinner. The 2024 halving cut block rewards in half; combined with subdued transaction fees at times, this has made 2025–2026 particularly challenging.

Energy price spikes, leading to curtailments or shutdowns. Many miners, especially those with higher electricity costs or older hardware, are operating at breakeven or losses. Estimates suggest 15–20% of the global fleet may be unprofitable at these levels, with some public miners reporting weighted average cash costs near $80,000 per BTC mined.

This has led to hashrate reductions, hardware price drops, and even some sales of BTC to cover expenses. Miners are adapting in several ways: Curtailment and energy trading: Shutting down during high power prices and earning credits from grids. Many large operations are repurposing infrastructure for artificial intelligence and high-performance computing, which can yield 5–10x higher revenue per MW than pure Bitcoin mining.

Listed miners have announced tens of billions in AI-related contracts, potentially shifting up to 70% of revenue away from BTC by end-2026. Efficiency improvements: Newer, more energy-efficient ASICs and better management software.

Historically, such periods of low hashprice and miner capitulation have preceded hashrate recoveries once difficulty adjusts downward and/or Bitcoin’s price rebounds. Lower hashrate can make remaining miners more profitable per unit of power.

Bitcoin trades around $66,000–$68,000, with hashrate near or below 1 ZH/s and hashprice still compressed. While painful for pure-play miners, these dynamics highlight Bitcoin’s resilient design: the network self-regulates via difficulty adjustments, and weaker players exit, strengthening long-term security.

This is a classic cyclical phase in mining economics—challenging in the short term but often setting up for stronger periods when conditions improve. They remain the best way to track ongoing developments.