The political climate in Africa has been turbulent since August 2020, with a wave of abrupt military coups upending nascent, developing, and struggling democracies across West and East Africa. From an averagely considered perspective, these unilateral military takeovers represent a concerning regression to Africa’s chaotic early post-independence days. However, a closer examination reveals nuances beyond this simplified narrative.

International Condemnation vs. Domestic Acceptance of Coups

The political tonality of the de facto position of these coups from Western countries seems more interesting than the ecstasy of nine successful coups and counter-coups in the space of three years across Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Gabon. With the recent coup in Niger, we saw how voracious the West and ostensibly the whole world championed by France could be in condemning a military takeover with such vigour and ardency that almost blurred the lines of the principle of non-intervention. However, this vigour and ardency saw a continuous decline from the Niger coup to the Chad coup through the Mali coup to the Burkina Faso coup to the Guinean coup to the Sudan coup and the Gabon coup.

What is more interesting to note is the fact that the French Foreign Ministry issued a statement justifying the Chad coup as necessary in the circumstances. The unfolding of these events raises fundamental questions as to what is the benchmark for condemning military takeovers and what attenuating and aggravating circumstances affect the vigour and ardency with which they are likely to be condemned. However, this is not the subject matter of this piece.

More saliently, public receptiveness towards new military rulers appears inversely related to the vigour of international denunciations. Prima facie, a defined pattern or trend is noted. The coups facing the harshest foreign censure were welcomed most enthusiastically by local populations. Conversely, citizen resistance hardened as global condemnation tapered ostensibly with the exception of Gabon. This pattern can be theoretically expressed as: “Ceteris paribus, the more forceful the international outcry, the greater public acceptance of the revolutionary government and vice versa”.

This is mathematically expressed as follows:

Let x = level of international condemnation.

Let y = level of public acceptance.

Then f(x) = y, ceteris paribus.

Should this be true, Gabon’s outlier will simply be excused on the basis that all things were not equal, and these must be serious enough to have shut the mouth of France even when Ali Bongo asked them to make noise.

The Nuanced Relationship Between Democracy and Rule of Law

Beyond the superficial rhetoric of our preceding mathematical musings, we discern a pattern in the rebukes that have often arisen, which invariably decried the coups as threats to democracy and constitutional order in the affected nations, effectively calling for a return to the rule of law. Interestingly, the intertwined concepts of democracy and the rule of law are not entirely foreign to the broader populace in those countries. In their most basic forms, these notions are well grasped. Admittedly, nuanced complexities could be unpacked from within them, not readily within the precincts and faculty of the broader populace, enabling the fuller realisation of their potential.

However, the idea of democracy retains utility when understood simply as government by and for the people, which is closer to Lincoln’s words. Similarly, the concept of the rule of law has value when taken to mean that all are equally accountable to the law. The above summation may seem reductive, particularly compared to the more prevalent view of elections as democracy’s essence.

However, we contend that regular, free, and fair elections are correlates, not constituents, of democracy – they operationalize the rule of law, not popular sovereignty, particularly when the subject of electioneering is regulated by statutes or the constitution of such a state. Hence, Robert Dahl’s emphasis on popular sovereignty rings truer as democracy’s core.

In effect, when assessing politics through a democratic lens, the process of accessing power matters less than leaders’ popularity and public consent. However, where the analysis is made through the lens of the rule of law, the procedure of gaining power bears more weight than mass support. Leaders derive legitimacy from public acceptance, not the technicalities of assuming power. This nuance explains unpopular democratic regimes and conversely, widely supported extra-legal ones. Recognition of this distinction will add nuance to analyses of African politics as complex new chapters unfold.

Generally, and more particularly, within African societies, a leader’s legitimacy stems not solely from the procedural legality of their ascent, but profoundly from public acceptance and support. The court of public opinion plays a vital role in validating authority, frequently superseding concerns of technical correctness.

Throughout history, charismatic figures lacking formal claims to leadership have nevertheless garnered legitimacy through inspiring mass followings. Their ability to galvanize popular backing lent validity to their rule. Such includes influential revolutionaries like Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea, all of whom led successful revolutions and thereafter legitimized their authority through widespread support.

Where procedural rules seem inadequate or unjust, regimes assuming power extra-legally sometimes attract significant public sanction. Though technically unlawful, they gain legitimacy by popularity. The 2020 Malian coup, which deposed an increasingly unpopular Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, accused of electoral manipulation, falls within this context. Despite international rebuke, many citizens welcomed the coup as necessary to restore democratic integrity. The junta’s pledges to hold elections and combat corruption ensured continuing public backing.

Similarly, Guinean’s 2021 overthrow of Alpha Conde followed mass protests against third term ambition. Protesters widely endorsed the transitional military council as steering the nation back towards democracy. Though unelected, their active support lent legitimacy despite procedural irregularity. Likewise, prominent local leaders may exercise considerable informal authority without holding office. Their prominence stems directly from public faith in their leadership. This grassroots legitimacy frequently rivals that of formally elected officials.

When Elections Fail to Produce Responsive Leadership

While free and fair elections that uphold the rule of law are intended to produce governments representing the popular will, this ideal is not always achieved in practice. Legal frameworks and institutions can enable democratically elected governments to retain power despite waning public support.

South Africa exemplifies how liberation credentials and constitutional structures allow a once-revered party to maintain its grip on power. Though the African National Congress (ANC) faces growing unpopularity and repeated corruption allegations, it continues dominating politics decades after apartheid’s end. The ANC benefits from lingering loyalty among Black voters for its resistance role. Meanwhile, a proportional representation system without local constituencies reduces pressure on politicians to renew localised appeal. These advantages have empowered the ANC to sustain parliamentary majorities amidst declining popularity.

Similarly, Malaysia’s United Malays National Organization (UMNO) long persevered despite emerging corruption claims. UMNO strategically capitalized on a first-past-the-post system that favours larger parties. It also cultivated robust patronage networks and ties between party elites, business leaders, and its ethnic Malay base. Only after internal dissent fragmented its support did UMNO finally lose its majority in 2018.

These cases demonstrate how legal frameworks like electoral systems, along with partisan structures and voting patterns, can allow unpopular incumbent parties to maintain control. Merely conducting free and fair elections does not guarantee responsive and popular leadership. Long after public satisfaction wanes, ingrained loyalties and institutional mechanics may sustain entrenched powers.

Winding Up

In conclusion, while military coups clearly undermine institutional norms and the rule of law, public support for extra-legal changes in leadership cannot be dismissed as ignorance or naivety. Rather, it often stems from perceptions that existing legal frameworks have failed to produce governments responsive to popular needs and demands. Where electoral processes are viewed as compromised or inefficient, segments of the population may view coups or revolutions as necessary correctives restoring “government by the people.”

However, such support rests on the assumption that new regimes will transition toward greater democracy and accountability. If they instead consolidate authoritarian power, public backing quickly fades. The enthusiasm greeting many African coups arose from pledges to hold elections and address corruption. If these promises go unfulfilled, legitimacy will rapidly deteriorate. Extra-legal transitions ultimately gain enduring validation not simply by popularity, but by progressing toward the rule of law and institutions that uphold popular sovereignty. No government, whether democratically elected or self-appointed, can expect lasting acceptance without meaningful accountability, transparency, and responsiveness to its citizens’ aspirations.