The United States is attempting to regain narrative control after a dramatic weekend that reshaped Venezuela’s political leadership and injected fresh volatility into global energy markets, with senior officials now softening the tone of President Donald Trump’s declaration that Washington would “run” the South American country.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sunday sought to reframe the administration’s intentions following the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by U.S. forces and his transfer to New York to face drug trafficking charges. While Rubio did not dispute the scale of U.S. intervention, his remarks suggested a strategy anchored more in economic coercion and geopolitical leverage than in direct governance.

Speaking on ABC’s This Week, Rubio said the United States would not directly administer Venezuela, instead relying on what he described as an intensifying oil “quarantine” and a sustained regional military buildup to force political and structural change. The distinction matters, particularly after Trump’s blunt comments a day earlier that the U.S. would “run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition.”

Those remarks immediately triggered alarm across Washington, reviving memories of prolonged U.S. interventions that became costly both politically and financially. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer warned that regime change and nation-building efforts have historically exacted a heavy toll on Americans, a view echoed privately by some U.S. allies uneasy about the scope of Washington’s ambitions.

Rubio’s language appeared designed to calm those fears without retreating from the substance of U.S. policy. He emphasized that Venezuela’s economy would remain effectively frozen until conditions acceptable to Washington are met, arguing that oil remains the central pressure point. The United States has already seized tankers linked to Venezuelan crude exports and expanded naval and air deployments across the Caribbean, moves that signal readiness to enforce the blockade aggressively.

At the center of the strategy is Venezuela’s oil sector, long crippled by underinvestment, sanctions, and mismanagement, yet still sitting atop the largest proven crude reserves in the world. Trump’s remarks on Saturday made clear that energy is not peripheral to U.S. thinking. He said American oil majors would be invited to invest billions of dollars to rehabilitate Venezuela’s “badly broken” oil infrastructure, a statement that immediately raised questions about whether Washington’s intervention was drifting toward economic reengineering.

Rubio attempted to draw a line between pressure and control. He said the U.S. objective was not to seize oil fields, but to prevent sanctioned oil from entering global markets until Venezuela’s energy governance is overhauled. He also argued that private investment, particularly from Western firms, would ultimately benefit Venezuelans by restoring capacity and efficiency, distancing the sector from actors aligned with Iran or other U.S. adversaries.

Even so, the administration’s own comments underline how deeply oil considerations are woven into the political strategy. Rubio said Interior Secretary Doug Burgum and Energy Secretary Chris Wright would begin assessing Venezuela’s energy landscape and engaging with potential investors. While he noted that Chevron remains the only U.S. company currently operating in the country under limited authorization, he expressed confidence that Western firms would show strong interest once conditions shift.

The implications are widening for global oil markets. Traders and analysts say the tightening U.S. oil quarantine could remove Venezuelan barrels more decisively from circulation at a time when supply-demand balances are already fragile. Heavy crude grades, in particular, are expected to feel the impact, forcing refiners in the Americas to adjust feedstock strategies. Market participants say the unfolding situation could reset pricing assumptions in the coming days as uncertainty over Venezuelan output, exports, and future ownership structures grows.

The political fallout inside Venezuela is equally profound. Following Maduro’s capture, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as president, creating a transition that remains contested and highly sensitive. Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, arrived in New York on Saturday night, marking a symbolic and legal turning point that could further polarize Venezuelan society and its regional allies.

Rubio acknowledged that Trump retains the option of further military action, reinforcing the sense that the current phase may be only one step in a longer campaign. His comments on NBC’s Meet the Press that the president “retains all his optionality” have added to regional anxiety, particularly in Caribbean states already affected by airspace disruptions linked to U.S. strikes. Airlines have scrambled to add flights after closures stranded tens of thousands of passengers, illustrating how quickly the crisis has spilled beyond diplomacy and energy into civilian life.

The administration now faces a delicate balancing act. It must reassure domestic and international audiences that it is not embarking on open-ended nation-building, while simultaneously applying enough pressure to reshape Venezuela’s political and economic systems. Rubio’s careful recalibration suggests recognition that Trump’s rhetoric, while forceful, may have overshot what allies and markets are prepared to absorb.

What remains clear is that the convergence of regime change, oil sanctions, and military signaling has pushed Venezuela back to the center of global geopolitics.

Egypt and Qatar have moved to deepen their energy partnership at a time when gas supply security is becoming increasingly critical for Cairo, signing a memorandum of understanding that formalizes cooperation on liquefied natural gas sales and imports and positions Qatar as a key supplier ahead of the summer demand peak.

The development is seen as a clear signal that Cairo is recalibrating its gas strategy after a sharp reversal of fortunes that has seen Africa’s largest gas producer increasingly reliant on imports to keep the lights on.

The memorandum of understanding covers LNG sales and imports, with specific provisions for supplying Qatari cargoes to Egypt’s Ain Sokhna and Damietta ports. QatarEnergy said the agreement includes the delivery of up to 24 LNG cargoes during the upcoming summer, a critical period when electricity consumption spikes and gas shortages have, in recent years, triggered rolling power cuts and public frustration.

At its core, the deal reflects the widening gap between Egypt’s gas supply and demand. Once buoyed by major offshore discoveries and rising output, Egypt had positioned itself as a regional energy hub, exporting LNG to Europe and neighboring markets while processing gas from Israel and, potentially, Cyprus. That ambition has been steadily undermined since late 2022, when domestic production began to decline.

Official data illustrates the challenge. Egypt produced 3,635 million cubic meters of gas in October last year, up slightly from September but still well below the 3,851 million cubic meters recorded in the same month of 2024, according to figures from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative. The decline has persisted even as demand continues to rise, driven by population growth, industrial expansion, and a power sector that depends heavily on gas-fired generation.

This imbalance has forced Egypt into an uncomfortable position. Instead of exporting surplus LNG, Cairo has increasingly had to compete on the global market for cargoes, often at premium prices, while also boosting pipeline imports from Israel and planning future inflows from Cyprus. The cost of these imports has strained public finances at a time when Egypt is already grappling with inflation, currency pressures, and a broader economic reform programme.

Against that backdrop, the agreement with Qatar offers a measure of stability. Qatar is the world’s largest LNG exporter, with vast reserves and a well-established shipping and trading network. Securing up to 24 cargoes for the summer gives Egypt a clearer line of sight on supply during peak demand months, reducing the risk of sudden shortages or emergency purchases on the spot market.

The choice of Ain Sokhna and Damietta as delivery points is also telling. Ain Sokhna hosts Egypt’s floating storage and regasification units, which allow LNG imports to be quickly converted back into gas for domestic use. Damietta, long associated with LNG exports, underscores how Egypt’s infrastructure is being repurposed as circumstances change. Facilities once built to ship gas abroad are now increasingly critical to meeting domestic needs.

For Qatar, the deal strengthens its footprint in a strategically important market. As Doha presses ahead with massive capacity expansions at the North Field, it has been keen to secure long-term and medium-term outlets for its LNG. Egypt, with its large population, growing energy demand, and established infrastructure, represents an attractive partner, particularly within the Middle East and North Africa region.

The agreement also fits into a broader regional pattern of energy cooperation. Middle Eastern producers and consumers are increasingly leaning on intra-regional trade to manage volatility in global markets and hedge against geopolitical shocks. Thus, sourcing LNG from Qatar may prove more predictable for Egypt than relying solely on spot cargoes that are vulnerable to swings in Asian or European demand.

Still, the deal highlights the distance between Egypt’s current reality and its stated ambitions. Petroleum Minister Karim Badawi said last week that Egypt plans to achieve self-sufficiency in oil and gas, according to a cabinet statement. That goal rests on boosting domestic production through new exploration, improved recovery from existing fields, and faster development timelines.

But some energy analysts caution that reversing the production decline will not be straightforward. Many of Egypt’s major gas fields are mature, and discoveries have been smaller and more complex. At the same time, investment decisions have been affected by payment arrears to international oil companies and broader fiscal constraints.

In the near term, LNG imports are likely to remain a fixture of Egypt’s energy mix, particularly during summer months. The deal with Qatar provides breathing room, but it also underscores how far Egypt has drifted from its earlier role as a net gas exporter.

Analysts believe that whether Cairo can stabilize production and regain that status will depend on sustained investment, regulatory clarity, and the pace of new discoveries. Agreements like this one with Qatar are usually less about expansion and more about damage control, ensuring that power generation and economic activity are not derailed by fuel shortages as demand continues to climb.

Ethiopia has edged closer to resolving one of Africa’s most closely watched sovereign debt crises after striking a preliminary agreement with a group of investors holding a significant portion of its $1 billion international bond that matured in 2024.

The deal, disclosed by the Finance Ministry on Friday, marks a critical milestone in the country’s prolonged effort to restructure its debt following its first-ever default late in 2023.

In a statement posted on the ministry’s official Facebook page, Ethiopian authorities said the parties had reached an “agreement in principle” covering the core financial terms of the bond restructuring. While the announcement signals meaningful progress, the government stressed that discussions are still ongoing over the non-financial terms of the new debt instrument that will replace the defaulted Eurobond.

These outstanding elements typically include legal provisions, governance clauses, and other structural features that can materially affect investor protections and the long-term viability of the reworked debt.

Coordination under the G20 Common Framework

The agreement has been communicated to both the International Monetary Fund and Ethiopia’s Official Creditor Committee (OCC), which represents bilateral lenders under the G20’s Common Framework for debt treatments. That step is crucial, as the framework requires comparable treatment across all creditor classes — bilateral lenders, multilateral institutions, and private bondholders — to prevent any group from receiving preferential terms.

“The terms of the Agreement in Principle have been communicated to the OCC for their non-objection as well as to the IMF to ensure compliance with Ethiopia’s long-term debt sustainability,” the ministry said.

An IMF spokesperson welcomed the development, describing it as an important advance in Ethiopia’s reform programme.

“This marks an important step toward restoring debt sustainability,” the spokesperson said in an emailed response. “We will assess the consistency of the agreement with the objectives and parameters of the IMF-supported program in the coming days.”

IMF approval is widely seen as a linchpin for Ethiopia’s broader recovery strategy, not only to unlock further disbursements under its Fund-supported programme but also to rebuild confidence among external investors and development partners.

According to the finance ministry, the Ad Hoc Committee involved in the talks consists of institutional investors controlling more than 45% of the outstanding 2024 Eurobond. Formal negotiations between the two sides took place between December 23 and January 1, following months of informal engagement that yielded limited progress.

Ethiopia said it aims to complete the restructuring process and implement the new bond instrument as early as possible in 2026. That timeline underscores both the complexity of the negotiations and the need to align private-sector concessions with agreements already reached with official creditors.

In July, the government finalized a restructuring deal with bilateral lenders, which it said would provide more than $3.5 billion in cashflow relief. That agreement was widely viewed as a necessary precursor to serious negotiations with bondholders, who have often been reluctant to commit without clarity on the scale of relief granted by governments and multilateral institutions.

Ethiopia defaulted on its sole international bond in late 2023 amid severe macroeconomic strains, including chronic foreign exchange shortages, high inflation, the economic fallout from internal conflict, and tighter global financial conditions. The default pushed the country into the G20 Common Framework, making it one of the highest-profile African economies to test a mechanism that has been criticized for slow timelines and procedural complexity.

Since then, progress has been uneven. While talks with bilateral creditors advanced more quickly, negotiations with private bondholders dragged on for months, highlighting persistent coordination challenges between different creditor groups.

What the preliminary deal signals

Although specific financial terms were not disclosed, restructurings under the Common Framework typically involve a combination of maturity extensions, reduced interest payments, and, in some cases, nominal haircuts on principal. The unresolved non-financial terms could cover issues such as governing law, dispute resolution mechanisms, and performance-linked features tied to Ethiopia’s economic recovery.

The agreement in principle offers investors the clearest indication yet that Ethiopia is moving toward a resolution, reducing uncertainty after a prolonged period of stalemate. For the government, it represents progress toward stabilizing public finances, restoring external credibility, and eventually regaining access to international capital markets.

Ethiopia’s restructuring is being closely watched by other low-income and frontier-market countries grappling with unsustainable debt burdens. A successful outcome would strengthen the case that the G20 Common Framework can deliver results, even if slowly, for countries with diverse creditor bases.

However, finalizing the deal will require securing sufficient bondholder participation, IMF sign-off, and continued implementation of domestic economic reforms. With growth pressures, social demands, and external financing needs still acute, Ethiopia’s debt challenge is far from over.

For now, however, the agreement in principle represents the most substantive step yet toward closing a chapter that has weighed heavily on the country’s economy since its 2023 default — and a tentative move toward financial normalization after years of strain.