By

Dr. Kaze Armel, Lecturer, Xiangtan University, School of Law, China-Africa Research Institute

Dr. Ogwu Ikechukwu, Lecturer, International  Education School, Hunan Institute of Engineering, Xiangtan.

Introduction

The idea of an “Afro-European Century” envisions a transformative era where Africa and Europe leverage their partnership to achieve shared prosperity, global influence, and sustainable development; thereby reshaping their roles in the global order. The European Union (EU) -Africa partnership, built on decades of cooperation through summits, trade agreements, and investment initiatives, has the potential to realize this vision by harnessing complementarities in economic, social, political, and environmental domains. Certainly, the EU-Africa development partnership is one of the most critical international relationships, shaping not only the futures of the two continents but also having profound global implications. Its criticality stems from a complex interplay of history, geography, shared challenges, and mutual opportunity. The history of European colonialism in Africa, for instance, created deep economic, linguistic, and political linkages, but also a legacy of exploitation and imbalance. This history imposes a moral and ethical responsibility on Europe to support equitable development and address historical injustices in Africa, creating a new era defined by mutual dependence, demographic complementarities, and a complex web of economic, political, and cultural interdependencies. The realization of this future, however, is not guaranteed. It requires a fundamental re-evaluation of current partnership models, a confrontation with lingering neocolonial mindsets, and a commitment to people-centered policies. By leveraging Africa’s demographic dividend to address Europe’s aging workforce and by fostering a truly equal partnership based on win-win development agendas, both continents can unlock unprecedented shared prosperity. Africa is home to a plethora of natural resources and fast growing market that presents opportunities for the EU’s growth and development, leveraging its expansive industrial capacity. Similarly, both Africa and EU faces similar challenges such as climate change, immigration, and security, making cooperation a more pragmatic approach to the partnership than competition or isolationism.

Recent history of EU-Africa economic and Trade partnership

The historical relationship between Africa and Europe has been profoundly shaped by a dominant worldview known as Eurocentrism. This perspective, dates back to the Renaissance and flourished in the 19th century, frames Europe as the center of global events, the primary player and architect of world history, the bearer of universal values and reason, downplaying or ignoring the historical contributions of non-Western cultures. For centuries, this intellectual framework provided a “justifying rationale” for the hierarchical subjugation of Africa and Asia, cementing a sense of assertiveness about European culture that advanced with its military, trade, and religious forces. In response to this, Afrocentrism emerged as a critical scholarly and cultural movement. It presents a worldview that centers on the history of people of African descent and seeks to conduct research from the perspective of historical African peoples and polities. The aim is to counter what are seen as mistakes and myths perpetuated by Eurocentric academic disciplines.

The emergence of Afrocentrism is more than a mere academic or cultural counter-current; it is a direct and logical consequence of the centuries-long “solid European domination of intellectual concepts and philosophical ideas”. The existence of a movement dedicated to inverting the established historical hierarchy reflects a necessary, albeit complex, stage in dismantling a unipolar worldview. The criticism, articulated by scholars like Kwame Anthony Appiah, that Afrocentrism risks replacing Eurocentrism with an “equally ethnocentric and hierarchical curriculum”  highlights the difficulty of transcending a hierarchical model even when attempting to dismantle it. This suggests that achieving a truly “Afro-Euro Century” requires not just a shift in power but a fundamental change in the way knowledge and history are conceptualized and shared—a move from a zero-sum, hierarchical view to a collaborative, multi-centric one where diverse narratives can coexist without competing for a single position of dominance.

Indeed, the EU-Africa development partnership, long defined by a donor-recipient dynamic and rooted in colonial history, has undergone significant evolution in recent years. The emerging trends reflect a strategic pivot towards a partnership framed in terms of mutual interest, geopolitical necessity, and competition. The shift is driven by a confluence of shifting geopolitical dynamics, economic priorities, and global challenges such as climate change, migration, and digital transformation.

Key drivers

The evolution of the EU-Africa partnership is not spontaneous; it is a calculated response to several powerful drivers. The most fundamental structural driver of the coming century is the stark demographic divergence between Africa and Europe. While Europe’s population is aging and shrinking, Africa’s is experiencing an unprecedented boom and youth bulge. The United Nations projects that Africa’s population will reach close to 2.5 billion by 2050, comprising more than 25% of the world’s total, and could reach nearly 40% by the end of the century. This growth is so significant that five of the eight countries expected to account for more than half of the global population increase over the next three decades are in Africa. In contrast, Europe’s population growth has been the slowest of any continent, projected to shrink by 4% between 2000 and 2050. This divergence has created a profound age imbalance: the average African is just under 20 years old, while the average European is over 42. This demographic complementarity—where Europe’s crisis and Africa’s opportunity converge—creates a long-term pressure for policy frameworks to facilitate mutually beneficial migration. A failure to manage this dynamic properly would result in a “lose-lose” scenario: a demographic liability for Africa and an economic slowdown for Europe. The 2015 migration crisis seared the issue of irregular migration into the European political consciousness. EU member states, driven by domestic political pressure, have made managing migration flows a central objective of African policy. This has led to a securitisation of the partnership, where development aid is increasingly leveraged to secure cooperation on border control, readmission agreements, and stemming transit routes. Similarly, the proliferation of jihadist insurgencies across the Sahel and elsewhere directly threatens European security, making stability and counter-terrorism cooperation a non-negotiable priority.

Another push factor in the desire for stronger EU-Africa development partnership is geopolitical rivalry and the scramble for influence. The assertive presence of alternative global powers in Africa, notably China, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf states has pushed the EU to reconsider its relations with Africa. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offering massive infrastructure loans with “no-strings-attached,” has challenged the EU’s normative, conditionality-based model, while Russia’s expansion of security partnerships is quickly reshaping political allegiances in the continent, away from European metropoles.

The third driver revolves around economic necessity. Africa’s economic potential is undeniable. Its vast, youthful population represents both a future market and a potential labour force. More critically, the continent holds over 30% of the world’s mineral resources, including those essential for the digital and green revolutions (cobalt, lithium, platinum, and rare earth elements). For the EU to achieve its strategic autonomy and its ambitious European Green Deal, it requires secure, sustainable access to these critical raw materials. This economic imperative demands a deeper, more investment-focused partnership that moves beyond traditional aid.

Finally, the African agency and the demand for equality has jolted the EU into action. A crucial internal driver is the increased assertiveness of African leaders and institutions. Spearheaded by the African Union (AU) and embodied in modern initiatives like the Africa’s Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), a historic effort to create a single liberalized market to boost intra-African trade and industrialization. The AfCFTA’s vision is to reverse Africa’s historical over-reliance on the export of unprocessed primary commodities, typifying the growing and unified demand for a partnership of equals. African leaders explicitly reject paternalism and are skilfully using the geopolitical competition to their advantage, negotiating better terms and insisting that partnerships align with their own priorities, as outlined in key frameworks like the Africa Agenda 2063. The EU can no longer dictate terms. It must negotiate them.

Outcomes of the EU-Africa development partnership

Trade facilitation.

The EU-Africa economic and trade partnership is a cornerstone of bilateral cooperation, leveraging complementary strengths to foster sustainable development, economic growth, and mutual prosperity. The partnership, rooted in agreements like the Cotonou Agreement and its successor, the EU-OACPS Partnership Agreement, as well as initiatives from the EU-Africa Summits, is critical for Africa due to its role in addressing the continent’s economic challenges, enhancing trade, and supporting Agenda 2063 goals. Key Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) have been signed between the EU and African countries. The EU-Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA, implemented in 2016, grants countries like South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia duty-free access to the EU for 98.7% of their exports. South Africa’s citrus exports to the EU, valued at €1.2 billion annually, have grown significantly due to this agreement. EPAs enhance Africa’s export competitiveness, diversify economies away from raw commodities, and boost foreign exchange earnings. For instance, Namibia’s beef exports to the EU increased by 20% between 2016 and 2022, supporting rural livelihoods while earning money to the national exchequer.

Support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The EU provides technical and financial assistance to AfCFTA, launched in 2019, to create a single market for 1.3 billion people, potentially worth $3 trillion. This includes capacity-building for trade negotiations and customs systems. The EU’s €74 million program (2020) supports AfCFTA’s implementation, training African negotiators and harmonizing trade standards. Another €300 million partnership with Niger, sealed in 2022 aligns with AfCFTA by boosting local economies. These initiatives are important to the continent as AfCFTA could increase intra-African trade from 17% (2022) to 30% by 2030, reducing reliance on external markets. Additionally, the EU support also fosters economic diversification and industrialization, critical for job creation. Africa needs 15 million jobs annually yet the continent can only generate about 3 million jobs annually, at the moment.

Infrastructure development.

Africa faces an infrastructure financing gap of $68–108 billion annually, according to the African Development Bank. Investments in digital, energy, and transport infrastructure are critical for economic growth. The Global Gateway initiative, the European Union’s investment strategy to mobilize up to €300 billion in sustainable and high-quality infrastructure projects worldwide between 2021 and 2027, exemplifies this shift. This represents a positive shift from pure aid to investment-led cooperation, potentially addressing Africa’s immense infrastructure financing gap, with €150 billion earmarked for Africa, in infrastructure, digital, climate, and health projects. The initiative, launched as part of the 2022 EU-AU Summit, has so far mobilized significant investments, with 138 flagship projects adopted between 2023 and 2025 in sectors like transport and digital connectivity. These projects aim to enhance trade efficiency and regional integration, as seen in the development of 11 strategic transport corridors across Africa. The EU’s focus on private-sector engagement, through mechanisms like the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), aims to de-risk investments and attract private capital to Africa, where only 3% of global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows.

A focus on green transition.

Africa’s abundant renewable energy resources such as solar, wind and youthful workforce position it as a hub for green and digital innovation. The continent’s partnership is now central to the EU’s green strategy. The 2022 EU-AU Summit highlighted a “Green Alliance,” and the EU is aggressively pursuing Critical Raw Materials Partnerships with individual African nations to secure access to essential minerals. This offers a potential win-win as Africa could gain investment in mining and processing infrastructure, moving up the value chain and creating jobs. The EU on the other hand would gain diversified supply chains. The EU’s European Green Deal and its alignment with Africa’s development priorities emphasizes green growth, sustainable energy, and climate resilience, with initiatives like the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP), promoting universal access to affordable and sustainable energy. The EU’s push for green hydrogen and renewable energy projects, such as the scaling up renewables in Africa campaign, reflects a commitment to combat climate change while addressing Africa’s energy access gap.

Youth and civil society engagement.

The EU-Africa partnership increasingly recognizes the role of youth and civil society as drivers of change. Events like the Africa-Europe Week in 2022 and the Youth in Action “Finance the Future” Forum in 2024 highlight efforts to include young people in shaping the partnership. The AU-EU Youth Cooperation Hub and the Africa-EU Civil Society Forum provide platforms for dialogue, producing actionable recommendations on issues like sustainable finance and governance. These initiatives respond to Africa’s youthful demographic (its median age is 14 years younger than Europe’s) and aim to empower youth to address global challenges.  However, recommendations from these forums often lack binding commitments, and the AU’s relatively passive role in agenda-setting suggests an imbalance in decision-making power. This raises questions about whether these engagements are symbolic or genuinely transformative.

Strengthened political dialogue.

The evolving partnership between the two sides has fostered regular high-level engagements, such as the EU-AU Ministerial Meetings and the upcoming 2025 EU-AU Summit. These platforms have deepened political dialogue, however the AU’s limited agenda-setting power suggests an unequal partnership.

Digital transformation.

This is another growing focus area, with investments in projects like the Blue Raman submarine cable to enhance connectivity between Europe, Africa, and India. These efforts aim to bridge Africa’s digital divide and foster innovation. However, African stakeholders have expressed concerns that these initiatives may prioritize European strategic interests, such as energy security, over local industrial capabilities.

Criticisms of the Africa-EU Development partnership

Despite a rhetorical emphasis on a “strategic” and “equal partnership,” cooperation between the two unions is widely critiqued for being limited and lacking strategic direction. The relationship is still primarily defined by EU financial support for AU activities. From the perspective of some African leaders, there are lingering concerns about the EU’s “neocolonial” attitude. Although European leaders have engaged an overdrive gear in efforts to generate positive frameworks of relations with Africa, nearly every pillar of the engagement has received much criticism. The relationship often features a pattern of one-way agenda-setting, where the EU projects its own internal priorities—such as the green and digital transitions—onto its external relations with Africa, side-lining issues that are more important to African partners, such as agriculture and the informal sector.

The biggest challenge in fostering a more sustainable relation between Africa and Europe revolves round historical facts around colonialism and entrenched systems of control in modern times. African countries are deeply cautious about the intentions of the EU, a fact that is drowning out the true voices of progress on both sides.

The recent push-back against France in Africa, marked by military withdrawals, anti-French protests, and a shift toward new global partners, for example, has significantly diminished Paris’ influence on the continent. The end of Françafrique reflects a broader African demand for sovereignty and a rejection of neo-colonial dynamics. While France attempts to adapt through new strategies, its role as a dominant power in Africa is unlikely to recover, with long-term consequences for its geopolitical and economic interests.

The efficacy of foreign aid has also been fiercely debated, with critics arguing that it has failed to deliver sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. This is a central contention of Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo’s book, Dead Aid, which argues that traditional aid is a “cancerous disease” that fosters corruption and dependency rather than promoting sustainable growth. Moyo points to the fact that while Europe has poured over $1 trillion in development assistance into Africa in the last 50 years, Africa has seen little human growth or economic development, while Asian countries that received little aid are now more prosperous. The argument is that this particular form of aid creates “moral hazards,” making it easy for corrupted leaders to divert funds, undermining local economic activities and civic initiatives.

On specific EU partnership proposal with Africa, disquiet has also been expressed. The emphasis on green and digital transitions, is for instance seen to be more aligned closely with EU priorities, such as securing critical raw materials (CRMs) for its green economy, than with Africa’s immediate needs, like skills development or technology transfer. The power imbalance posits a danger of creating a new “green colonialism,” where Africa remains a supplier of raw materials rather than developing its own green manufacturing capacities. The outcomes will depend on whether these deals include genuine technology transfer and support for African-owned value addition.

The push by EU to invest in Africa through initiatives like Global Gateway Initiative appears to be heavily inclined to favour resource-rich regions rather than least developed countries. The Initiative, is critically viewed as a reactive, geostrategic tool to counter China rather than a genuinely altruistic development plan. In fact, much of the West did not pay attention to Africa, at least in an economic and strategic sense, until after the Beijing summit in November 4, 2006, at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) with the theme “Friendship, Peace, Cooperation and Development” which featured over 5000 people, from heads of government or government representatives from 48 African countries and 24 international and regional organizations, including the United Nations and the African Union.

The risk is that the EU’s projects and interventions are chosen for their geopolitical value such as creating alternative supply chains, rather than their local developmental impact. Furthermore, the slow rollout of concrete projects, compared to China’s rapid delivery, also raises questions about its effectiveness.

Conclusion

The EU-Africa partnership has made strides toward a more strategic, investment-driven relationship, but it also remains constrained by historical imbalances and competing priorities. The EU’s emphasis on green and digital transitions aligns with global trends but risks prioritizing its own interests over Africa’s developmental needs. The focus on extractive industries and migration control perpetuates a donor-recipient dynamic, undermining the narrative of equality.

Africa’s growing agency, through frameworks like AfCFTA and the AU’s global advocacy, offers an opportunity to rebalance the partnership. The EU  should support it as a single, powerful trading bloc. This would empower Africa to leverage its combined population and resources on the global stage and foster the industrialization and value-added production necessary for long-term growth. The EU must move beyond symbolic gestures, such as youth forums, to empower African stakeholders in decision-making. The lack of focus on industrialization and technology transfer remains a critical gap, limiting the partnership’s transformative potential.

Essentially, the EU-Africa development partnership is at a crossroads, shaped by trends toward investment, green and digital transitions, and youth engagement. While initiatives like Global Gateway signal progress, outcomes are tempered by unequal power dynamics and misaligned priorities. For the partnership to achieve its goal of mutual benefit, the EU must prioritize Africa’s industrialization, enhance local ownership, and address structural grievances. Only then can it evolve into a truly equitable collaboration that delivers sustainable prosperity for both continents.